

Philosophy, Cognitive Science, and Policy:

Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Generative AI from Wittgenstein, Lewis, Dennett, and Nagel

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Why This Matters Now

20 With the EU AI Act entering into force on August 1, 2024 (with obligations phased in
over time) and enterprise "copilot" tools rapidly rolling out across platforms like
Microsoft 365 and Google Workspace, the widespread deployment of GPTs - by both
open-source communities and commercial AI labs - has moved beyond the experimen-
tal phase. Understanding the limits of large language models is no longer an academic
exercise; it is a personal, professional, and regulatory imperative.

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Who Should Read This?

- AI engineers and product managers
- Policymakers and regulators
- 30 • Ethicists and social scientists
- Designers and technical communicators
- Educators and critically engaged lay readers

Abstract

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This paper explores how four classical philosophical frameworks - specifically Ludwig Wittgenstein's language games, David Lewis's conversational scorekeeping, Daniel Dennett's intentional stance, and Thomas Nagel's account of subjective consciousness – collectively inform what I call “The Four Philosophers Framework™” (or “The 4-Philosophers Framework™”)¹, a model for deepening our understanding of generative AI, particularly large language models (LLMs) such as GPT architectures operationalized by commercial, State and not-for-profit entities.

Wittgenstein emphasizes the social and embodied nature of meaning; Lewis illustrates how conversational context evolves dynamically; Dennett offers a pragmatic lens for interpreting AI behavior “as if” it were intentional; and Nagel reminds us that behavioral fluency does not imply inner experience.

Building on these classical foundations, the paper also incorporates insights from embodied cognition, cognitive architectures, social constructivism, pragmatism, and emerging work in AI interpretability, ethics, and global governance. Although some suggest that advanced models may approximate facets of human cognition, this paper argues that LLMs remain fundamentally limited: they lack perspective, embodiment, social grounding, and subjective awareness.

The paper proposes actionable design strategies - including memory-augmented architectures, interactive learning, and transparency tools - and addresses counterarguments, ethical risks, and policy implications. Throughout, concepts are introduced in accessible language to engage readers across disciplines.

Executive Summary

This paper argues that large language models (LLMs) like - but not limited to - OpenAI's ChatGPT exhibit four distinct philosophical limitations that fundamentally constrain their capabilities. Drawing on the work of Wittgenstein, Lewis, Dennett, and Nagel, it proposes a multi-layer diagnostic framework for understanding what LLMs can - and cannot - do.

LLMs generate fluent, contextually appropriate text across diverse tasks. Yet they fail in four key dimensions:

- **Wittgensteinian grounding:** They lack participation in the communal, embodied practices that give language its meaning.

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- **Lewisian coherence:** They cannot maintain evolving conversational context over time, leading to conversation fragmentation.
- 70 • **Dennettian attribution:** They invite over-trust via anthropomorphic projection, despite lacking true beliefs or desires.
- **Nagelian interiority:** They simulate understanding but possess no subjective experience.

These failures are not bugs - they are deep conceptual mismatches between what is (simulation) and what is not (cognition). Understanding them is now urgent, given accelerating real-world deployment of generative AI in education, public policy, health-care, and commercial domains.

This interdisciplinary inquiry draws from philosophy of mind and language, embodied cognition, technical AI research, and ethics. It offers not only critique but practical guidance: design patterns to surface model limitations, policy tools to reduce epistemic confusion, and research agendas to test and discipline over-claims of understanding. A diagnostic matrix synthesizes the four distinct philosophical lenses into design and governance implications. The conclusion calls for clarity: performance (by LLMs) must not be mistaken for possession (of subjective experience).

85 By recognizing LLMs as powerful simulations - not minds - we can guide their development and use responsibly, ethically, and safely - for the welfare and betterment of all.

Keywords: generative AI; language games; scorekeeping; intentional stance; consciousness; embodied cognition; AI ethics; cognitive science; neuroscience; explainable AI; cognitive architectures; post-humanism; AI governance; policy; global regulation. EU AI Act 2024; enterprise copilot; large language models; anthropomorphism; AI governance; responsible AI.

1. Introduction

Generative AI - epitomized by large language models (LLMs) such as OpenAI's GPT series - is reshaping how humans interact with machines. These systems can generate contextually fluent text across a wide array of domains, from education and law to health-care and creative work. But as their influence grows, so too do the stakes: How should we interpret their linguistic outputs? Do they "understand" language in any meaningful sense? And based on the answer to that question, what design and policy principles should govern their development?

Addressing these questions requires more than empirical benchmarks. It demands conceptual clarity. This paper draws on foundational insights from philosophy of language and mind - particularly the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, David Lewis, Daniel Dennett, and Thomas Nagel - to show that the limitations of generative AI are not just technical, but philosophical. These thinkers help diagnose the distinction between simulating understanding and possessing it.

This framework is deliberately interdisciplinary. It integrates classical philosophy with current developments in cognitive science, interpretability research, and policy debates. The aim is both diagnostic and prescriptive: to reveal where LLMs fail to replicate key dimensions of human cognition, and to map those failures to design strategies, user expectations, and regulatory action.

1.1 Roadmap²

- **Section 2** surveys foundational philosophical and technical literature - covering cognition, embodiment, interpretability, and normative ethics - to establish the conceptual boundaries within which LLMs operate.
- **Section 3** introduces a four-part diagnostic framework, drawing on Wittgenstein, Lewis, Dennett, and Nagel to reveal distinct failure modes in generative AI: lack of grounding, contextual incoherence, misattributed agency, and the absence of consciousness.
- **Section 4** synthesizes these perspectives into a unified diagnostic model, mapping each philosophical critique to specific system vulnerabilities - semantic, pragmatic, epistemic, and moral - and linking them to technical and policy domains.
- **Section 5** operationalizes the framework, offering concrete design principles, stakeholder guidance, regulatory alignment strategies, and an agenda for future research.
- **Section 6** concludes by reframing alignment as a multi-layered challenge - one that requires not only technical fixes, but philosophical clarity about what LLMs are, what they simulate, and what they will never be.

Together, these sections argue that while LLMs simulate linguistic competence, they do not possess understanding - and that grasping this distinction is critical to designing, deploying, and governing generative AI responsibly.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Philosophical Foundations of AI

Early debates in AI-related philosophy set the stage for understanding generative models. A seminal argument is John Searle's Chinese Room (Searle, 1980), which posits that mere symbol manipulation (as in a computer following code) does not yield genuine understanding or semantics. Searle's thought experiment suggests that an AI could appear to converse fluently in Chinese by following syntactic rules, yet lack true understanding - implying that syntax alone does not produce semantics. In contrast, Alan

² For definitions of key terms referenced in the Roadmap and throughout the paper (e.g., "language game," "score-keeping," "intentional stance"), see the Glossary of Key Terms at the end of this document.

145 Turing’s criterion for intelligence (the Turing Test, Turing, 1950) focuses on observable
behavior: if a machine’s responses are indistinguishable from a human’s, we may as
well call it intelligent, sidestepping the question of internal understanding. This tension
between behaviorism and semantic internalism continues to inform debates about
LLMs to this day. Hubert Dreyfus (1992) and before him Martin Heidegger (1927) of-
150 fered phenomenological critiques, arguing that intelligence is deeply tied to embodied,
context-rich experience in the world - something classical AI lacked. Shannon and
Weaver’s (1949) information theory provided a foundation for computational linguistics
and the statistical approach used by modern LLMs, but by treating information primar-
ily in terms of bits and entropy, it did not address the deeper question of the *meaning* of
that information. John Haugeland later underscored the importance of “embodied in-
155 tentionalality” in understanding cognition, presaging arguments that true intelligence
must incorporate more than abstract symbol processing.

Embodied Cognition Theory has since grown into a significant perspective in cognitive
science, emphasizing that human cognition arises from real-time interactions between
the mind, body, and environment (Clark, 2008; Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1992). By
160 grounding thought in sensory and motor processes, embodied cognition suggests that a
non-embodied AI - merely manipulating linguistic symbols - may never achieve the full
richness of human-like understanding. In the context of generative AI, this raises ques-
tions about how LLMs, which rely on text-only training, could ever capture the lived
experiences that shape human linguistic meaning. Indeed, some researchers propose in-
165 tegrating robotics or multimodal data (visual, tactile, auditory) to give AI systems at
least a partial “body in the world,” thereby potentially mitigating the symbol-ground-
ing problem.

2.1.1 Predictive Processing & Active Inference

Contemporary cognitive science recasts perception and action as forms of prediction-er-
170 ror minimization. Karl Friston’s free-energy principle models brains as ‘Bayesian ma-
chines’ that act to reduce the gap between expected and incoming sensory signals, fram-
ing cognition as a form of self-organization through predictive modeling. Andy Clark
extends this to a full predictive-processing account, portraying agents as “surfing”
waves of uncertainty by constantly updating generative models of the world. These
175 theories bridge pure symbol-processing and embodied views, because meaning
emerges from anticipatory interaction rather than static representation.

2.1.2 Cognition in AI–Robotics Experiments

Building on predictive processing, 4E theories (Embodied, Embedded, Enactive, Ex-
tended) insist that cognition is *situated in bodily action*. Recent robotics studies show that
180 equipping agents with multimodal tactile sensors and proprioceptive feedback
markedly improves language-conditioned task performance (e.g., slip-resistant grasp-
ing). The empirical takeaway is clear: without a sensorimotor loop, text-only LLMs can-
not ground symbols in physical affordances, reinforcing the symbol-grounding critique.

2.1.3 Symbolic Resurgence & Neuro-symbolic Hybrids

185 Additionally, not everyone believes “scale will solve reasoning.” Marcus & Davis
(2020) argue that robust commonsense inference still requires explicit symbolic scaffold-
ing layered atop neural networks. Early neuro-symbolic systems - differentiable logic
engines, neural theorem provers - hint at a synthesis path that counters both “brute-
force statistics” and “pure embodiment,” challenging claims that pattern recognition
190 alone closes the reasoning gap.

This bridges directly to cognitive architecture research, where modular models simulate
goal-directed behavior.

Cognitive Architectures like SOAR or ACT-R offer another angle on how AI might
move beyond brute-force statistical approaches toward something more akin to human
195 cognition (Laird, 2012; Anderson et al., 1998). These architectures model functional
modules - such as memory stores, perceptual processors, and rule-based reasoning -
suggesting a way for AI systems to integrate symbolic and sub-symbolic processes.
While large language models excel at pattern recognition and language generation, they
typically lack the structured memory and goal-directed components that cognitive ar-
200 chitectures attempt to replicate. Incorporating insights from these architectures could
enrich the design of future LLMs, making them more context-aware, capable of long-
term planning, and sensitive to the “global workspace” aspects of cognition. Re-
searchers exploring hybrid approaches argue that bridging LLMs with cognitive archi-
tectures or memory-augmented modules might yield AI systems that demonstrate more
205 robust forms of reasoning and understanding.

These foundational debates raise a central challenge: can generative AI move beyond
sophisticated symbol manipulation to a genuine grasp of meaning? Recent critics of
LLMs echo these concerns, describing them as ‘stochastic parrots’ - models that gener-
210 ate plausible text without true comprehension. Proponents, however, point to increas-
ingly general capabilities of advanced models as evidence of at least a form of under-
standing emerging from complex patterns. This literature provides a backdrop for ap-
plying specific philosophical lenses - Wittgenstein’s language games, Lewis’s score-
keeping, Dennett’s intentional stance, and Nagel’s critique - to AI systems, which we
turn to in subsequent sections.

215 2.2 Wittgenstein’s Philosophy and AI

Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later work, especially *Philosophical Investigations* (1953), intro-
duces the idea of language games, wherein meaning emerges from use within specific
social activities and contexts. Words do not have fixed definitions in isolation; their
meaning is defined by the “rules” of the particular language game being played. For in-
220 stance, the word pawn means something different in the “game” of chess than it does in
everyday conversation. Crucially, for Wittgenstein, language is a public, social activity -
rule-following and meaning are grounded in shared forms of life (cultural and practical
contexts). While some scholars argue that AI could become a participant in language

225 games through sufficient interaction, this paper follows the view that true language use
is inseparable from human forms of life - contextually rich, socially embedded, and em-
bodied. Scholars like P. M. S. Hacker and Danièle Moyal-Sharrock have argued that this
communal nature of language poses a challenge for LLMs, which generate text based on
statistical patterns rather than genuine participation in human forms of life. Winograd
and Flores (1986) similarly drew on Wittgenstein (and Heidegger) to critique AI's
230 purely formal approach to language, suggesting that computers lack the lived context
that imbues human language with depth. From this perspective, if an AI lacks an au-
thentic understanding of the rules as grounded in human practice, it is not truly "play-
ing the language game" - merely simulating it.³

235 Social Constructivism further illuminates this communal aspect by arguing that mean-
ing is co-created through social interactions and shared conventions. In line with
Wittgenstein's emphasis on public criteria for rule-following, social constructivists high-
light how the collective negotiation of concepts shapes reality - an iterative process in
which humans converge on norms and meanings. LLMs, by contrast, rely primarily on
static text corpora, lacking the ongoing communal feedback loops that living language
240 communities use to refine and revise their shared linguistic practices.

Pragmatism - particularly as advanced by philosophers like William James and John
Dewey - parallels Wittgenstein's view that meaning is rooted in practical usage. Prag-
matists argue that concepts acquire meaning through their consequences and utility in
real-world problem-solving contexts. From this angle, a word's significance lies in how
245 it guides action and thought. While LLMs can generate contextually appropriate text,
they do so without genuine practical engagement or an experiential stake in the out-
comes. Thus, one could argue that, from a pragmatist standpoint, LLMs remain de-
tached from the pragmatic dimension that underpins genuine rule-following in human
language use.

250 This issue ties back to the symbol grounding problem: LLMs handle symbols (words)
without direct connection to their real-world referents. Consequently, critics question
whether generative AI can ever achieve meaningful language use if it never participates
in the "forms of life" that give words their significance. Others maintain that sufficient
breadth and depth of data might approximate the effects of communal participation, al-
255 lowing the model to mimic context-sensitive use fairly closely. Whether such mimicry
counts as "understanding" is an open debate, which subsequent sections explore from
multiple philosophical angles.

³ Recent work by Spiegel et al. (2024) reinforces this critique through computational modeling. Agents in a simulated environment failed to develop meaningful symbolic communication using behaviorist learning alone. Only when equipped with a visual theory of mind - i.e., the capacity to model what others perceive - could they generate referential signs. This aligns with Wittgenstein's insight that language derives its meaning not from isolated rules or outputs, but from shared social and perceptual contexts - forms of life.

2.2.1 When AI Enters the Language Game: A Tractatus-to-Investigations Bridge

260 A useful expository move (developed in contemporary commentary) is to stage the contrast between Wittgenstein's early picture theory in the *Tractatus* and his later view that meaning is grounded in use within socially embedded language games. For the present paper, this contrast does not function as authority for Wittgenstein interpretation; rather, it helps isolate a practical question for AI governance: when LLM text enters human practices, what changes in the practice itself? (Lucia, 2025).

Recent empirical work provides concrete footholds for this "practice-shift" framing:

- In a controlled dialogue task, speakers were less likely to repeat an interlocutor's syntactic structure when they believed the partner was an AI agent rather than a human (Li, 2025).
- 270 • In comparative corpus work on argumentative essays, ChatGPT-generated texts exhibited substantially lower interactional meta-discourse (e.g., hedges, boosters, attitude markers), producing a more impersonal rhetorical stance even when structural coherence was high (Jiang & Hyland, 2025).
- In large-scale analysis of arXiv abstracts over a decade, LLM-preferred lexical markers increased post-ChatGPT alongside shifts in lexical, syntactic, cohesion, and readability features, suggesting detectable population-level drift in academic prose (Bao et al., 275 2025).
- In multi-agent settings, populations of LLM agents can converge on shared conventions without explicit human instruction, illustrating a limited but real form of convention-formation under interaction (Ashery, Aiello, & Baronchelli, 2025).

2.3 David Lewis and Contextual Dynamics

David Lewis's scorekeeping theory of conversation (Lewis, 1979) provides another useful lens for understanding how context shapes linguistic meaning. In any dialogue, participants keep a metaphorical "score" of the context - facts that have been established, assumptions about what words refer to, the state of the conversation, and so forth. As 285 the conversation progresses, each utterance can update this contextual score. For instance, if someone says "Let's meet at the bank" in the middle of a fishing discussion, the score (context) will record that bank likely refers to a riverbank rather than a financial institution. Lewis's core insight is that meaning in conversation is highly dynamic and context-dependent, maintained through an implicit consensus that constantly 290 evolves with each contribution to the dialogue.

Modern LLM-based chatbots mimic a form of scorekeeping by using attention mechanisms to track recent context in an input window. This allows them to exhibit a degree of context-sensitivity - answering follow-up questions coherently, interpreting pronouns, and so forth. However, unlike human interlocutors, LLMs typically have a fixed 295 memory window and do not genuinely retain long-term context or purpose.

Consequently, once the text falls outside the model’s input buffer, it no longer influences the “score.” This leads to known limitations: an AI may contradict earlier statements or fail to adapt to subtle context shifts over the course of a lengthy conversation.

300 Cognitive Pragmatics research reinforces the importance of adaptive context management. Human communicators track not only what has been said but also participants’ intentions, background knowledge, and situational cues, updating these assumptions as the interaction unfolds. By comparison, LLMs operate largely on local context, lacking an ever-evolving internal model of a conversation’s evolving goals and shared knowl-
305 edge. This shortcoming is especially noticeable in long, multi-turn dialogues where references to earlier details can get lost or overridden by newer inputs.

Memory-Augmented Neural Networks offer one potential remedy. By integrating a structured memory component (e.g., an external database or a specialized neural module), AI systems can preserve key facts and conversation states beyond the immediate
310 token window. Such architectures could allow an LLM to retrieve relevant past information and maintain a more robust “score” over extended exchanges. Similarly, logic-based approaches like Reiter’s default logic (1980) can complement neural methods by encoding and updating assumptions until contradicted by new information. Developers are actively experimenting with different techniques to address LLMs’ memory limita-
315 tions, aiming to improve contextual coherence and consistency.

By applying Lewis’s theory to LLMs, we see that context is not a static snapshot but a dynamic, continuously renegotiated framework. Designing AI systems that actively update their “conversational scoreboard” - through memory-augmentation, retrieval strategies, or a blend of symbolic and sub-symbolic reasoning - represents a critical step
320 toward achieving more human-like dialogue management.

2.4 Dennett’s Intentional Stance and AI

Daniel Dennett’s intentional stance (Dennett, 1987) is a strategy where we interpret an entity’s behavior by ascribing beliefs, desires, and intentions to it - treating it “as if” it were a rational agent. This stance is pragmatically useful for predicting the entity’s be-
325 havior, regardless of whether it actually possesses a mind. For example, one can predict a chess computer’s moves by assuming it “wants” to win and “knows” the rules of chess, even though internally it is merely executing algorithmic processes. In the context of large language models, this stance naturally arises when users say an AI “knows” a great deal or “understands” questions, even though the AI is ultimately a statistical en-
330 gine generating text.

A key implication of adopting the intentional stance toward AI is the risk of anthropomorphism - mistakenly attributing human-like understanding, motives, or emotions to systems that do not actually possess them. Such over-ascription can lead users to develop misplaced trust or emotional bonds with AI, resulting in adverse outcomes (Co-
335 eckelbergh, 2020). For instance, a user who believes a chatbot genuinely “cares” might divulge sensitive information or rely on it for emotional support in contexts where

professional human help is needed. From an ethical standpoint, designers and policy-makers must anticipate and mitigate these risks. Features like user education, disclaimers (“I am an AI and do not have feelings or personal beliefs”), or interface cues that highlight the AI’s limitations can reduce harmful anthropomorphism.

From a critical theory standpoint, how we talk about AI - in human-like terms or otherwise - reflects broader societal attitudes and power structures. Some scholars argue that the intentional stance can obscure the labor, data, and socio-technical systems underpinning AI development; by anthropomorphizing, we overlook the humans involved in data annotation, system maintenance, or the corporate entities that control AI technologies. Critical theorists warn that anthropomorphizing AI risks shifting accountability away from human designers and institutions. Consequently, critically examining why and how we deploy Dennett’s stance can reveal hidden assumptions about human agency, ethics, and technology’s role in society.

Overall, Dennett’s perspective underscores that the intentional stance is a choice rather than an assertion of fact. We can treat AI systems “as if” they have beliefs or desires to streamline interactions, but we must remember this is a heuristic tool, not a literal description of the AI’s internal states. Designing systems that clearly communicate their non-human nature can help users strike a balance - benefiting from the stance’s practical utility while avoiding undue anthropomorphism.

2.4.1 Interface Metaphors and the Chatbot Form

Recent HCI and AI ethics work strengthens the claim that anthropomorphism is not merely a user mistake; it is also a design condition. Ghosh, Venkit, Gautam, and Ghosh ask what would follow if AI systems were not primarily organized as chatbots, arguing that conversational interfaces are not neutral wrappers but sociotechnical forms that shape authority, expertise, overreliance, and intimacy. So, Cheng, and Murthy similarly propose treating anthropomorphism as a design variable rather than a binary defect, ranging from transparency-driven anti-anthropomorphism to hyper-anthropomorphic uncanniness. Empirical work by Kadambi and colleagues further shows that warmth, cognitive empathy, affective empathy, and competence influence different dimensions of trust, perceived anthropomorphism, usefulness, and relational closeness.

This literature reframes the Dennettian problem. The intentional stance is still a useful predictive shortcut, but the interface can make that shortcut feel like ontology. A chatbot does not simply receive anthropomorphic projection; it can invite, amplify, and stabilize it. The practical question for governance is therefore not only whether users over-ascribe mind to AI systems, but which interface metaphors make such over-ascription likely, durable, and consequential. Put differently, the interface is not merely a delivery wrapper; it helps establish the language-game in which terms such as “assistant,” “memory,” “care,” “understanding,” and “help” acquire practical force.

375 2.5 Nagel's Challenge to AI Consciousness

Thomas Nagel's famous essay "What is it like to be a bat?" (1974) poses a fundamental question about subjective experience. Nagel argues that even if we know everything about the objective, physical processes of a bat's brain, we still would not know what it is like for the bat to experience the world (e.g., the subjective feeling of echolocation).

380 This ineffable, first-person quality of experience - often termed qualia - highlights a potentially unbridgeable gap between an objective description (or simulation) of a being and the being's own perspective.

Applying this to AI, Nagel might ask, "What is it like to be GPT?" The common intuition is that there is nothing it is like to be GPT; an LLM, as an artifact, has no inner life or conscious viewpoint. It processes text statistically, without any "felt" experience. Hence, no matter how perfectly an AI might simulate human conversational behavior, there remains the so-called hard problem of consciousness unaddressed - namely, how subjective awareness could emerge from computational processes. Philosophers like David Chalmers (1996) distinguish between the "easy problems" of consciousness (explaining cognitive functions and behaviors) and the "hard problem" (explaining why and how those processes are accompanied by phenomenal experience). Current AIs tackle many of the "easy" cognitive tasks - categorizing images, conversing, playing games - yet according to Nagel's argument, they do not approach the hard problem, as there is no indication that their statistical algorithms generate subjective awareness.

395 Some contemporary neuroscientists and theorists have proposed measures or theories of consciousness (e.g., Tononi's Integrated Information Theory (IIT) or global workspace theory) to gauge how or whether consciousness might arise in an AI system. Under IIT, for instance, a purely feed-forward transformer model might score low on integrated information, suggesting it lacks the kind of unified, causal structure believed to underlie conscious states. Meanwhile, global workspace theory posits that consciousness emerges when information is broadcast broadly across different functional modules, a feature that LLMs currently lack. These debates remain speculative, indicating that Nagel's challenge still looms large.

405 A deeper concern is the potential illusion of consciousness. Because advanced LLMs can use language about subjective states - discussing emotions, introspection, or even "wanting" certain outcomes - people may over-interpret these outputs as evidence of sentience (*a la* Dennett). From an ethical standpoint, conflating fluent verbal performance with genuine subjective experience can lead to misplaced attributions of moral status or agency. Granting moral personhood to non-sentient systems, for instance, could skew responsibility and accountability (if an AI is "blamed" instead of the humans who developed or deployed it). Conversely, some futurists argue that if an AI's structure became complex, self-referential, and embodied in ways that approximate human cognition, a form of subjectivity might emerge - though this remains speculative and controversial. Such an extraordinary claim would demand extraordinary evidence.

415 Recent work on AI consciousness sharpens this point by distinguishing the direct meta-
physical question from the socially tractable one. Comşa argues that the question of
whether AI systems can be conscious remains presently intractable, given the lack of
420 consensus in consciousness science and the unresolved mind-body problem. By con-
trast, perceived AI consciousness - how users, institutions, and language communities
come to treat systems as if they had inner life - is tractable, timely, and governance-rele-
vant. This distinction reinforces the Nagelian boundary: policy does not need to settle
machine consciousness in order to regulate the social effects of perceived consciousness.

Nagel’s perspective thus acts as a cautionary guide. We should not conflate behavioral
sophistication with phenomenal consciousness nor rush to treat generative AI as moral
425 equals simply because they simulate human-like conversation. At the same time, it in-
vites an open-minded stance regarding the future: as AI systems evolve - potentially in-
tegrating more embodied approaches, multimodal data, or hybrid cognitive architec-
tures - the question of whether something *like* subjective experience might one day arise
cannot be dismissed outright - with standards to support such claims being high. For
430 now, however, Nagel’s question underscores the gulf between simulating a mind and
being a mind, setting ethical and philosophical boundaries around how we interpret
and govern current AIs.

2.6 Integration of Contemporary Debates and Broader Perspec- tives

435 Beyond the four key philosophers surveyed above, a wide range of contemporary de-
bates and interdisciplinary perspectives deepen our understanding of AI:

2.6.1 Post-humanism and AI

Post-humanist theories, such as Donna Haraway’s “Cyborg Manifesto” (1985), chal-
lenge strict human/machine dichotomies by emphasizing the hybridity of human and
440 technological systems. Rather than viewing AI as a mere tool, post-humanist view-
points encourage seeing humans and AI as forming novel, hybrid agents. These per-
spectives highlight ethical questions around human-machine symbiosis, prompting us
to reconsider how we define identity, cognition, and even ethical responsibility when
boundaries blur between organic and artificial intelligence.

445 A recent extended-mind variant of this debate pushes the point further. Gutoreva, Tsim,
and Papakonstantinou argue that contemporary AI increasingly participates in atten-
tion allocation, reasoning, synthesis, and decision-making, such that alignment should
be considered at the level of the human-AI cognitive system rather than the external
tool alone. This paper need not adopt the stronger claim that AI becomes “part of self”
450 to recognize the governance pressure it identifies: as users delegate framing, recall,
search, and judgment to AI systems, the boundary between assistance and epistemic de-
pendence becomes harder to police. The relevant risk is not only that users may trust a
bad answer, but that repeated delegation can reshape what users attend to, what they
treat as authoritative, and how they understand their own agency.

455 2.6.2 Critical Theory and Sociotechnical Context

Scholars in critical theory and science and technology studies (STS) argue that AI systems reflect - and can perpetuate - existing social power structures. By examining the political, economic, and cultural contexts in which AI is developed and deployed, critical theorists expose how data, algorithms, and platforms can reproduce biases or concentrate power. Treating LLMs as neutral objects overlooks the broader social fabric of labor, infrastructure, and corporate interests behind them (Coeckelbergh, 2020). This perspective resonates with Wittgenstein's emphasis on social practices and Dennett's warning about anthropomorphizing systems, cautioning us to question not just how AI "thinks," but who controls its design and whose values it serves. Language usage varies by culture, community, and context.

2.6.3 Embodied Cognition, Cognitive Architectures, and Mind-Body Framing

As noted earlier, embodied cognition frameworks argue that genuine understanding arises from the interplay between mind, body, and environment (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991). In practical AI terms, researchers experiment with multimodal architectures - incorporating vision, audio, or robotics - so that an AI interacts physically with the world, potentially alleviating some of the symbol-grounding problem. Meanwhile, cognitive architectures (e.g., SOAR, ACT-R) model AI systems on cognitive modules like memory, attention, and executive control, aiming for a more holistic approach than text-only LLMs. These advances resonate with Lewis's scorekeeping notion - an AI with richer memory or sensorimotor feedback could update its "conversational score" more dynamically. Studies comparing LLMs' internal representations to patterns in the human brain suggest intriguing parallels in how linguistic information is processed. Yet critical gaps remain: humans rely on long-term memory, emotional salience, and embodied knowledge that purely text-based models lack. Neuroscientific insights into consciousness, such as Global Workspace Theory or Integrated Information Theory (IIT), may further clarify the line between complex computation and subjective awareness (Chalmers, 1996; Tononi, 2012). While no current evidence suggests LLMs achieve anything akin to phenomenological consciousness, ongoing research keeps the debate open, particularly with the rapid evolution of AI architectures. Psychologist Ellen Langer's work on mind-body unity offers empirical reinforcement of the philosophical argument that language and framing are performative. In Langer's later account of the "counterclockwise" study, older men placed in a retrofitted 1959 environment reportedly showed improvements in measures such as grip strength, vision, and posture after being asked to inhabit the perspective of their younger selves (Langer, 2009). Because this study is known primarily through Langer's retrospective report rather than a standard peer-reviewed empirical article, it is best treated here as an illustrative example rather than as load-bearing experimental evidence. In another experiment, hotel maids told that their daily cleaning tasks "counted as exercise" showed improvements in weight, blood pressure, and body fat - despite no change in behavior (Crum & Langer, 2007).

Langer's core insight is that cognitive framing - how we linguistically and conceptually interpret our role or activity - can produce real physical changes. This research underscores a central Wittgensteinian theme: that language is not merely symbolic but participatory, altering how individuals inhabit their world. In the context of generative AI, Langer's findings sharpen the ethical concern that simulated language - especially when it evokes care, reassurance, or authority - can exert psychosocial influence on users, regardless of the system's lack of awareness or agency. When interface design amplifies such illusions, the user's belief becomes the substrate of impact - making epistemic framing not just a cognitive aid, but a public health and design imperative.

505 **2.6.4 Policy and Ethics Preview**

From a governance standpoint, AI ethics and policy discussions increasingly shape how generative AI is developed and deployed. The European Union's AI Act, adopted in 2024 and phased in over time, the UNESCO Recommendation on AI Ethics (2021), and the OECD AI Principles (2019) seek to balance innovation with transparency, accountability, and human rights. These frameworks often reflect key philosophical concerns: Dennett's stance on not attributing unwarranted autonomy to AI, Nagel's caution about conflating sophistication with consciousness, and Wittgenstein's emphasis on socially situated meaning. In practice, this can manifest as transparency mandates (e.g., labeling AI-generated content), accountability mechanisms (ensuring human oversight), and risk assessments (classifying AI systems by potential harm). Such policy efforts aim to align AI development with shared ethical norms, though global consensus remains a work in progress. Across these perspectives, several ethical and societal themes emerge. AI can amplify biases, concentrate power in the hands of a few technology ("tech") organizations, and reshape labor markets. Yet it can also enhance creativity, bridge language barriers, and support human-led research. Philosophical insights help stakeholders navigate these tensions: acknowledging AI's limitations prevents over-trust (Dennett), understanding its lack of subjective experience (Nagel) helps define moral boundaries, and recognizing its reliance on human language games (Wittgenstein) can direct us to more inclusive and context-aware AI design. Ultimately, an interdisciplinary approach - integrating philosophy, cognitive science, anthropology, ethics, and policy - provides the richest toolkit for guiding AI's ongoing transformation of society.

Model constitutions provide a contemporary case study in Lewisian scorekeeping. Anthropic's public Claude Constitution is presented as a statement of intended values and behavior that directly shapes Claude's behavior through training. Such documents can make conflict-resolution norms more explicit, but they also risk importing the public-law language of constitutionalism into a private technical artifact. Lepore's critique is useful here: when a private AI company describes model behavior through constitutional vocabulary, it does more than publish a policy; it helps define who appears to hold normative authority in the interaction. The governance task is therefore to keep the scoreboard clear: model constitutions may shape outputs, but commitments, liability, and legitimacy remain with human institutions.

In summary, contemporary discourse on AI is a tapestry of ideas from multiple fields. Classic philosophical frameworks articulate core conceptual distinctions, while emerging research in embodied cognition, critical theory, and public policy reveals how AI systems operate within - and shape - living human cultures. This backdrop lays the foundation for the theoretical framework in the next section, uniting philosophical insights with practical imperatives for responsible AI.

These contemporary insights set the stage for a closer examination of how four distinct philosophical lenses each diagnose a unique failure mode in generative AI.

545

3. A Philosophical Framework and Its Application

Having surveyed both classical philosophical sources and contemporary interdisciplinary perspectives, this section develops and applies a diagnostic framework for evaluating generative AI. The framework integrates four distinct philosophical perspectives - Wittgenstein's concept of language games, Lewis's theory of conversational scorekeeping, Dennett's intentional stance, and Nagel's critique of consciousness simulation - and draws on supporting insights from embodied cognition, social constructivism, and cognitive science.

555 Each thinker illuminates a specific dimension of AI limitations:

- **Wittgenstein** underscores how meaning is rooted in communal, rule-governed practices embedded in human forms of life.
- **Lewis** emphasizes the dynamic updating of conversational context and the interpretive scaffolding required for coherent dialogue.
- 560 • **Dennett** alerts us to the strategic but potentially misleading nature of treating AI "as if" it had beliefs or desires - useful heuristics that can slide into epistemic error.
- **Nagel** highlights the ontological gulf between behavioral simulation and genuine subjective experience, cautioning against equating AI fluency with AI consciousness.

565

These philosophical lenses do more than critique - they diagnose where and why generative AI systems fall short of humanlike cognition. When viewed through the prism of cognitive architectures and real-world deployment, these theories also offer practical design imperatives: from memory-augmented models and culturally situated fine-tuning to ethical guardrails and policy transparency.

570

In the subsections that follow, each philosophical perspective is presented alongside its direct implications for AI design, user interaction, and governance. This combined structure replaces any artificial division between theory and application. The goal is to

illuminate not only *what these systems can and cannot do, but how we should build and interact with them accordingly.*

3.1 Wittgenstein's Language Games and the Conceptual Boundaries of AI Comprehension

3.1.1 Philosophical Foundation

Ludwig Wittgenstein's later philosophy, especially *Philosophical Investigations* (1953), reimagines language not as a system of fixed correspondences, but as a family of socially embedded "language games." Meaning emerges not from formal structure alone but from use - rule-following within shared forms of life. Speaking, for Wittgenstein, is not merely arranging symbols; it is acting within a pragmatic context of human interaction, history, and expectation.

This view poses a deep conceptual challenge for large language models (LLMs). While systems like GPTs can produce fluent, grammatically impeccable text, they operate outside any lived social world. Their utterances are not situated within cultural routines or bodily experience; they are algorithmic continuations of token sequences. At best, they simulate participation in language games - but without inhabiting the lifeworlds those games presuppose.

Accordingly, the limitations of LLMs are not simply technical but philosophical. Their outputs often appear meaningful, yet lack the grounding in communal practice that renders human communication intelligible from within. In sensitive domains such as education, counseling, or legal advice, this distinction becomes ethically significant. Apparent competence, if mistaken for genuine participation, risks misleading users and undermining trust.

3.1.2 Ontological Limitations: Use Without Participation

Wittgenstein's framework highlights three conceptual discontinuities between human language use and LLM-generated text:

3.1.2.1 Statistical Imitation vs. Communal Rule-Following

LLMs learn from vast corpora by modeling statistical regularities. This allows for striking linguistic fluency but does not constitute participation in shared norms or social negotiations. Their "rule-following" is imitative rather than responsive - external rather than internal. As Shanahan (2022) notes, what appears as norm competence is better understood as pattern emulation.

3.1.2.2 Static Corpora vs Dynamic Correction.

Human language evolves through feedback and correction - norms shift, meanings adapt, mistakes are socially sanctioned or repaired. LLMs, by contrast, are trained on frozen datasets and cannot engage in iterative norm formation. Their grasp of language remains inertial: informed by past use, not responsive to ongoing negotiation.

3.1.2.3 Fluency Without Pragmatic Stakes

615 Pragmatists like Dewey and James remind us that meaning is tied to consequence - language does something because it matters to the speaker. LLMs have no skin in the game. Their outputs carry no intentionality, no risk, no concern. They simulate use, but without the pressures that give use its social and ethical force.

Sidebar: When AI “joins” the language game

A Wittgenstein-informed risk is not only that LLMs lack a “form of life,” but also that their fluent outputs can reconfigure human language games by shifting accommodation, genre norms, and conventions.

Three practical diagnostics are offered for deployments: (1) Are humans adapting their speech/writing differently because they believe the counterparty is AI? (Li, 2025). (2) Are we drifting toward structurally tidy but rhetorically flattened discourse in high-stakes contexts? (Jiang & Hyland, 2025). (3) Are we inadvertently standardizing vocabulary and genre markers across a population (e.g., “LLM-preferred” words) in ways that change readability, cohesion, or accessibility? (Bao et al., 2025).

Empirical implications for linguistic norms (what to measure):

- Accommodation effects: changes in syntactic priming, lexical entrainment, or politeness markers when users believe the interlocutor is AI (vs. human).
- Genre and stance drift: reductions in interactional meta-discourse (hedges, engagement markers, self-positioning) in organizational writing over time.
- Convention formation: stabilization of new terms, templates, or “preferred” phrasings that spread through teams after copilot-style drafting becomes routine.
- Downstream risk signals: increases in overconfident tone, reduced uncertainty marking, or widened mismatch between policy language and operational reality in high-stakes settings.

3.1.3 Counterpoint: Emergent Game Competence?

620 Some recent findings suggest that advanced LLMs can perform remarkably well in multi-turn, context-sensitive dialogues. For example, Bubeck et al. (2023) report OpenAI’s GPT-4 engaging in complex role-play scenarios involving implied rules, character continuity, and contextual memory. Could this indicate rudimentary participation in language games?

625 From a Wittgensteinian lens, the answer is no - but with a qualification. These performances are scaffolded by human engineering: carefully framed prompts, curated contexts, and social assumptions hard-coded into training data. The model does not negotiate norms; it echoes them. It does not adjust to new uses; it reproduces prior form. While the illusion of participation improves, the ontological status remains unchanged: LLMs approximate use, but cannot instantiate it.

630 Functionalist critics may argue that if an agent can act *as if* it were embedded in a form of life, the distinction may be practically irrelevant. However, this paper maintains that fluency alone is insufficient. Without feedback-sensitive interaction and embodied intentionality, there is no genuine rule-following - only a performance that mimics its surface.

3.1.4 Design and Governance Implications

635 Wittgenstein's insights demand that we rethink what "language competence" means in AI - and how systems should be designed and regulated to acknowledge their limitations.

3.1.4.1 Simulated Feedback and Iterative Alignment

640 Embedding LLMs in interactive learning environments - where they engage with domain experts or users in feedback loops - can improve pragmatic alignment. While this does not confer genuine participation, it may better simulate norm sensitivity.

3.1.4.2 Semantic Localization Through Cultural Fine-Tuning

645 Grounding language in local usage patterns - idioms, pragmatics, sociolects - can mitigate brittle outputs. But fine-tuning on regional data is no substitute for participating in the forms of life that produce such language. Cultural nuance cannot be fully abstracted into training tokens.

3.1.4.3 Toward Partial Embodiment

650 Multimodal and embodied extensions (e.g., robotics, vision, spatial mapping) offer limited pathways toward grounding. While embodiment may not solve the philosophical challenge, it could bridge part of the gap between linguistic output and pragmatic use.

3.1.4.4 Transparency by Design

655 Interfaces should clearly disclose that models simulate understanding. Framing mechanisms - like on-screen epistemic cues or usage disclaimers - can reduce the risk of over-interpretation. The model's role should be communicated as assistant or simulator, not interlocutor or agent. Psychological research supports this caution: Ellen Langer's findings on mind-body unity (see 2.6.3) show that cognitive framing—how individuals conceptualize roles, authority, or context—can produce not only behavioral shifts but physiological outcomes. When system interfaces fail to clarify simulated agency, users may respond to language as if it carries intention, care, or expertise, even when none exists.

660 3.1.4.5 Which Language Games Are More "Simulable," and Why That Still Matters

665 Wittgenstein's later work is often invoked to argue that LLMs, lacking lived participation in practices, cannot fully 'mean' what they say. That claim is broadly consistent with the paper's grounding thesis. But it needs one important nuance: not all language games depend on embodiment (or on the same kinds of embodied consequence) to the same degree.

Games such as chess, formal mathematics, and some forms of stylized writing are governed by relatively explicit rules and institutionalized criteria of correctness. In such cases, a system that can reliably track rules, produce compliant moves, and respond to

670 correction may appear to ‘participate’ in a meaningful sense at the level of performance. By contrast, games that presuppose situated stakes - clinical reassurance, interpersonal trust, practical instruction under uncertainty, moral address - depend heavily on shared forms of life: who is accountable, what counts as commitment, and what consequences follow from missteps.

675 This difference matters for the empirical studies introduced above. If users accommodate less syntactically when they believe they are speaking with an AI (Li, 2025), if AI-authored prose reduces interactional meta-discourse and stance (Jiang & Hyland, 2025), and if scholarly discourse shows detectable lexical and cohesion shifts after ChatGPT’s launch (Bao et al., 2025), these are plausible early indicators of norm drift within particular genres and settings. The Wittgensteinian question is therefore not only whether an LLM ‘has’ understanding, but which practices are being reshaped when fluent text is introduced into them - and what forms of accountability, correction, and consequence those practices require to remain intelligible.

3.1.5 Case Study: A Cross-Cultural Customer Service Bot

685 Consider a chatbot deployed in multilingual contexts. In the U.S., the phrase “I’ll take care of it” implies reassurance and proactive service. In Japan, the same phrase might signal polite evasion. If the model is fine-tuned on Western data, it may appear fluent across both settings - yet fail to meet user expectations in the latter.

690 The issue is not grammatical but cultural: the model cannot infer performative force from social context. Without exposure to tacit norms, its responses may be misaligned - even if they sound appropriate. This is precisely the kind of disembodied performance that Wittgenstein warned against.

Takeaway: Treat misunderstandings as language-game mismatches, not mere ‘bad prompts’; design should surface the active game (role, stakes, and norms) and make corrective feedback legible to both users and auditors.

695 3.1.6 Conclusion: Why Simulation Does Not Equal Use

700 Wittgenstein’s language games reveal the core conceptual gap: LLMs can simulate language use, but cannot *participate* in it. They lack the social embeddedness, pragmatic consequence, and normative responsiveness that make rule-following meaningful. The result is surface fluency without functional grounding - a kind of linguistic cosplay untethered from community life.

705 This matters because users often *assume* participation where there is only performance. Designers must resist that conflation. Policymakers must regulate systems with a clear-eyed view of their limitations. And researchers must treat grounding not as a benchmark score, but as a structural absence requiring new architectures - or new interpretive paradigms.

Having examined the role of use and form-of-life in generating meaning, we next turn to a different dimension of failure: the breakdown of contextual continuity. Here, David Lewis offers a second diagnostic lens.

710 **3.2 Lewis: Conversational Scorekeeping and the Architecture of Context**

3.2.1 Philosophical Foundation

715 David Lewis's theory of *conversational scorekeeping* (1979) recasts dialogue as a dynamic activity governed by evolving norms and background assumptions. In this metaphor, each utterance updates an implicit "score" - a shared contextual register of presuppositions, speaker commitments, and interpretive constraints. Communication, on this view, is not merely the exchange of information but the collaborative maintenance of an unfolding discourse structure.

720 Crucially, this score is not static; it shifts with each turn of talk, reframing what can be said next and how it will be understood. Human interlocutors manage this fluidity with remarkable dexterity - tracking shared knowledge, revising misunderstandings, and adapting to changing goals. Lewis's framework thus identifies context not as a passive backdrop, but as a continuously updated cognitive and normative infrastructure.

725 This conception has direct implications for large language models (LLMs). While these systems can appear context-aware, their performance often belies a fundamental constraint: they do not *track* or *revise* conversational scores. They generate each response *de novo*, drawing on token windows and prompt embeddings rather than an epistemically coherent discourse history. This produces a recurring class of limitations -
730 discontinuities, contradictions, and incoherence in multi-turn exchanges - that are not merely technical bugs but structural mismatches with how human dialogue unfolds.

3.2.2 Structural Limitation: Statelessness and Context Drift

Despite recent advances in context length and memory augmentation, LLMs still exhibit three core constraints that undermine genuine scorekeeping:

735 **3.2.2.1 Context Collapse Over Time**

LLMs perform admirably in short dialogues but struggle with longer exchanges. Even in models with 100K+ token windows (e.g., many recent GPTs from commercial entities), information placed in the "middle" of an extended prompt is prone to degradation - a phenomenon known as the *Lost-in-the-Middle* effect (Liu et al., 2023). This leads to
740 contradictions, forgotten clarifications, and inconsistent assumptions across turns. In human terms, it's as if the model keeps starting fresh - lacking any commitment to what has already been said.

3.2.2.2 Memory Without Revision

A. Retrieval is access, not reconciliation

745 Where memory modules exist (e.g., vector stores, external retrievers), they often function as access mechanisms rather than revision mechanisms: they help surface prior content, but do not by themselves perform conflict detection, belief updating, or cross-

episode consolidation. (Some newer approaches explicitly target more “human-like” long-term organization - but the need for additional machinery beyond vanilla vector retrieval is itself the point.) The model can fetch earlier statements but does not evaluate them in light of new information.

Human scorekeeping, by contrast, is revisionary: a speaker may update a prior belief, retract a presupposition, or reinterpret earlier claims. LLMs do not engage in this kind of retrospective coherence management; they retrieve, but rarely reconcile⁴. In real systems, retrieval frequently introduces conflicting evidence (ambiguity, misinformation, noise), which forces an additional step - ranking, adjudication, and consolidation - that retrieval alone does not supply.

B. Emerging approaches and the real bottleneck (scaling revision)

Recent systems increasingly combine retrieval with structured checking or domain constraints (e.g., retrieval-augmented generation, tool-using agents, causal or logic-guided overlays). These approaches can improve factual stability and local coherence, but they do not by themselves scale the kind of long-horizon reconciliation that Lewisian scorekeeping requires: detecting conflicts across episodes, deciding which commitments should be revised, and attributing revisions to shared standards rather than to prompt pressure. The bottleneck is therefore not the mere presence of memory, but the scalable integration of memory with revision and accountability.

Recent empirical work cuts both ways. Vervoort and Nikolaev (2025) propose a causal-reasoning test based on Lewis-style neuron diagrams and report that advanced LLMs (including ChatGPT, DeepSeek, and Gemini) can often correctly identify causes in scenarios that are actively debated in the causation literature - though their reported experiments are explicitly presented as preliminary rather than large-scale benchmark evidence.

The larger point for “memory without revision” still holds: in current systems, occasional successful local answers do not yet amount to a reliable, scalable capacity for retrospective coherence management across a growing record of commitments - especially when retrieved contexts are ambiguous, conflicting, or noisy.

⁴ Erik Hoel has recently formalized a related constraint on machine consciousness, arguing that *continual learning* is a necessary condition for any non-trivial, falsifiable theory of consciousness. On this view, systems that lack the capacity to revise internal representations across time — including current large language models operating in static or quasi-static regimes — cannot satisfy even functional criteria for consciousness. This result converges with the present argument that retrieval without norm-guided revision is insufficient for diachronic coherence or genuine scorekeeping. (Hoel, “A Disproof of Large Language Model Consciousness,” *arXiv*, 2025).

3.2.2.3 Absence of Norm-Tracking

Lewis's insight is that context is not merely informational - it is normative. Presuppositions constrain what counts as an appropriate next move. LLMs do not track this structure. Their responses may *sound* contextually appropriate but are generated without modeling which commitments remain live, which have shifted, and how interlocutors are jointly constructing meaning⁵. The result is an approximation of continuity that lacks dialogic depth.

3.2.3 Counterpoint: Advances in Long-Context Architecture

Recent innovations offer partial rebuttals to the diagnosis above. Hierarchical RAG systems like MAL-RAG (An et al., 2025) and plug-and-play positional re-weighting (Liu et al., 2024) allow models to prioritize salient context over raw recency. Meanwhile, experimental agents with "episodic" memory (e.g., BabyAGI, AutoGPT variants) suggest paths toward more stable discourse history management.

These developments are promising. But from a Lewisian standpoint, they address surface phenomena rather than structural needs. Improved memory retrieval is not equivalent to scorekeeping unless it supports norm-guided updating: recognizing which facts are still in play, which assumptions have shifted, and how new claims interact with what's been established. Without this, coherence remains a matter of token salience - not interpretive commitment.

3.2.4 Design and Policy Implications

Lewis's framework demands more than longer context windows. It calls for mechanisms that manage *interpretive continuity* - memory plus inference, retrieval plus revision.

3.2.4.1 Epistemically Active Memory

Memory-augmented LLMs should not only store prior content but reason over it - updating commitments, retracting outdated premises, and maintaining a dynamic conversational state. This may require hybrid architectures that integrate symbolic logic, Bayesian inference, or truth maintenance systems.

3.2.4.2 Score-Sensitive Retrieval

Rather than relying on lexical similarity, RAG modules should weight elements by conversational salience: statements that shift presuppositions, resolve ambiguity, or license new dialogue moves. This aligns retrieval with discourse structure, not just string matching.

⁵ Recent work proposing operational measures of *awareness* in artificial systems underscores the importance of maintaining category distinctions between access, responsiveness, and consciousness. Such frameworks explicitly avoid treating functional integration or goal-directed information use as evidence of subjective experience, reinforcing the present paper's insistence that apparent contextual sensitivity does not entail norm-tracking or phenomenology. ("Evaluating Awareness Across Artificial Systems," arXiv, 2026).

810 **3.2.4.3 Context Integrity Benchmarks**

Beyond accuracy or BLEU scores, LLMs should be evaluated on coherence metrics: contradiction avoidance, presupposition tracking, and ability to revise earlier commitments. These metrics could become part of “alignment audits” for public-facing systems.

815 **3.2.4.4 Accumulated Context and Conversational Scorekeeping**

A related Lewisian concern is that conversational systems do not merely generate isolated answers; they participate in an accumulating score. Recent work on high-affect interactions sharpens this point. Nicholls et al. (2026) argue that accumulated dialogue history can function as a stress test for model safety, revealing whether a model inherits a user’s prior premises as a shared worldview or treats them as evidence requiring evaluation. Nielsen and Osler (2026) caution against reifying “AI psychosis” as a novel psychiatric category, but their notion of “existential drift” captures a related phenomenological risk: sustained AI interaction may leave a user feeling anchored in shared reality while actually becoming enclosed in a more private, AI-mediated world. For governance, this means safety evaluation should include longer, stateful interactions, especially where distress, loneliness, dependency, or high trust could make conversational accommodation practically consequential.

3.2.4.5 Interface-Level Cues

Given the limits of internal context, interfaces should surface what the model is remembering, forgetting, or misinterpreting. Visual tools - like memory chips, conversation timelines, or user-editable “scratchpads” - can help users track context drift and re-anchor dialogue.

3.2.5 Case Study: The Forgetful Legal Assistant

A user consults a legal chatbot about a workplace injury, initially reporting that it occurred in November. Later, the user clarifies: the accident actually happened in December - a change that alters the relevant statute of limitations. But the model continues referencing November in its advice, never integrating the correction.

This is not a memory lapse; it’s a failure of scorekeeping. The model retrieves the initial claim but does not revise its interpretive frame. It treats utterances as static facts, not as evolving commitments. For a human lawyer, such an oversight would be a dereliction. For an LLM, it reveals the absence of discourse dynamics: no capacity to update the shared score, no mechanism to mark a presupposition as invalidated.

Takeaway: Legal or compliance uses should assume that retrieval is not revision; require traceable memory policies (sources, timestamps, and conflict flags) and defined human escalation when the system’s ‘commitments’ drift across sessions.

845 **3.2.6 Conclusion: Context Is Not Optional**

Lewis’s theory reveals that conversation is not a linear exchange of statements - it is a co-constructed, score-sensitive activity. Successful dialogue depends not only on what

is said but on how meaning evolves through presupposition, revision, and expectation. LLMs, despite their fluency, do not yet sustain this kind of collaborative interpretation.

850 Even as technical memory solutions improve, the deeper limitation persists: contextual competence is not merely quantitative (how much the model remembers) but qualitative (how it reasons about that memory in relation to norms). Without this, LLMs do not converse - they concatenate.

855 This matters because users rarely see the seams. Interfaces present outputs as if the system is tracking meaning over time, when in fact it may be generating each reply in interpretive isolation. Designers must therefore surface contextual boundaries. Policy-makers must treat context retention as a key metric for safe deployment. And researchers must ask not only what the model says - but what it remembers, revises, and forgets.

860 Having explored the breakdown of temporal coherence, we now face a more subtle risk: not just how LLMs handle conversation, but how humans interpret their behavior. To examine this, we turn to Dennett and the perils of anthropomorphic projection.

865 **3.3 Dennett: The Intentional Stance and the Risks of Anthropomorphism**

3.3.1 Philosophical Foundation

870 Daniel Dennett's concept of the *intentional stance* provides a powerful interpretive tool for understanding complex behavior. When faced with a system that exhibits goal-directed regularity - like a thermostat or a chess-playing computer - we often ascribe beliefs and desires to it, treating it *as if* it had mental states. This stance is not a metaphysical claim but a pragmatic heuristic: we explain and predict the system's behavior by attributing agency, regardless of its inner architecture.

875 In this light, the intentional stance is not inherently misleading. Dennett emphasizes that the utility of such attributions does not depend on whether the system is conscious, sentient, or even alive. The stance works when it enhances predictive success - nothing more.

880 However, large language models challenge the boundaries of this heuristic. Their fluency, responsiveness, and use of first-person language often invite anthropomorphic projections that go beyond functional explanation. Users routinely say, "ChatGPT knows," "Claude thinks," or "Gemini believes" - and often act on those assumptions. This raises a deeper concern: when simulation evokes not just utility but belief in presence, the stance can slide from fiction into confusion.

3.3.2 Interpretive Slippage: From Heuristic to Epistemic Error

885 Three overlapping dynamics make LLMs particularly prone to stance inflation:

3.3.2.1 Pragmatic Usefulness vs. Misplaced Confidence

Interpreting an LLM as if it “knows” something can streamline interaction. It allows users to engage naturally and receive coherent replies. But this same framing risks over-
 890 ascription. LLMs do not “know” - they estimate token probabilities. Their apparent un-
 derstanding is a byproduct of linguistic regularity, not internal cognition. When fluency
 masks this distinction, epistemic error ensues.

This caution should not be confused with a ban on all anthropomorphic vocabulary. Recent
 mechanistic interpretability work by Sofroniew et al. (2026) reports that Claude Sonnet 4.5 con-
 895 tains internal representations of emotion concepts that causally influence behavior, while explic-
 itly denying that such representations establish subjective emotional experience. The governance
 distinction is therefore not “never use human psychological vocabulary,” but rather: use such vo-
 cabulary only within the right language-game. “Desperation” may be useful technical shorthand
 for a measurable representation with behavioral effects, but it should not be converted into user-
 facing claims that the system feels desperate, has welfare interests, or occupies a Nagelian point
 900 of view.

3.3.2.2 Anthropomorphic Design Choices

Interface elements - avatars, conversational tone, first-person pronouns - amplify the il-
 lusion of agency. Systems that express care, memory, or self-reflection appear more re-
 latable but also more sentient. These cues, while often well-intentioned, can reinforce
 905 mistaken beliefs about what the model is and is not.

Recent HCI work, discussed above in Section 2.4.1, sharpens this point by treating an-
 thropomorphism not merely as a user-side cognitive bias, but as an interface variable.
 So, Cheng, and Krishna Murthy (2026) argue that LLM interfaces often reinforce anthro-
 910 pomorphic metaphors while masking the sociotechnical reality of the system: infra-
 structure, human labor, data, training, and deployment choices. This supports the
 Dennettian claim that the intentional stance must be bounded at the design layer, not
 merely corrected through user education.

3.3.2.3 Simulation of Selfhood

LLMs can simulate persona. They may adopt roles, express emotion, or recall earlier
 915 statements (if within window). To many users, this suggests coherence of self. Yet these
 outputs are surface-level. There is no stable agent behind the utterances - only a proba-
 bilistic engine stitching together likely continuations. Treating this as continuity of *per-
 spective* is a category error.

3.3.3 Counterpoint: Critical and Functionalist Perspectives

Some argue that concerns about anthropomorphism are overstated. If the intentional
 920 stance works, why resist it? Indeed, in HCI and affective computing, designers often
 lean into anthropomorphism to foster user comfort and engagement. Others, drawing
 on post-humanist or actor-network theory (e.g., Haraway, Latour), suggest that agency
 is already distributed - our definitions of “agent” are themselves culturally constructed.
 925 From this view, it may be misguided to draw a firm ontological line between humans
 and machines.

This paper acknowledges the value of these critiques but maintains a practical distinction: anthropomorphism without constraint risks epistemic and ethical distortion. Even if agency is socially constructed, design choices still shape user belief - and belief forms behavior. The issue is not whether the intentional stance is wrong, but whether it is responsibly bounded. Fiction is only safe when it is recognized as fiction.

3.3.4 Design and Policy Implications

Dennett's stance, if left unqualified, can inflate expectations, distort accountability, and blur ethical lines. Design and governance must therefore intervene to make the boundary visible.

3.3.4.1 Transparent Framing of Outputs

Interfaces should make the heuristic nature of interaction explicit. Labels like "AI-generated response," or tooltips reminding users that "this system does not have beliefs or experiences," can reduce stance inflation. Placement matters: these cues must be ambient and persistent, not buried in disclaimers.

Empirical work on transparency and disclosure cues has reported mixed results: users may overlook labels, treat disclosure as a proxy for trustworthiness, or continue to anthropomorphize despite being informed. Design guidance should therefore treat disclosure as necessary but not sufficient - pair always-visible provenance cues with interaction constraints (for example, scoped affordances, uncertainty cues, and friction for high-stakes actions) that make the system's non-agentic status salient in use. This aligns with Langer's findings on the mind-body effects of framing: cognitive awareness of a label may not override an embodied response to fluent, socially-shaped language. This also suggests that transparency should be metaphorical as well as textual: the interface should make the system's material and institutional character visible, not merely label the output as "AI-generated."

Recent work on interface metaphors and anthropomorphic cues suggests that disclosure should be paired with metaphor-level design choices: the system should not merely announce that it is non-sentient while the surrounding interface continues to invite intimacy, warmth, and quasi-personal reliance.

3.3.4.2 Role and Persona Constraints

In sensitive domains - therapy, education, law - LLMs should be role-limited. Constraints on tone, vocabulary, and self-reference (e.g., avoiding "I understand what you're going through") can prevent misattribution of care or authority.

3.3.4.3 Calibrated Explainability

Explainability features (e.g., chain-of-thought traces, attention maps) can inadvertently reinforce the illusion of cognition. When shown why a model "chose" a response, users may infer that it *thought* through alternatives. Such tools should be paired with meta-explanations: cues that clarify these visualizations reflect statistical salience, not intentional reasoning.

3.3.4.4 Emotional Simulation Boundaries

Systems that use emotionally expressive language should be clearly marked. In high-affect contexts, simulated empathy should be framed as just that: a performance - not a reflection of care or awareness. This protects users from confusing affective realism with genuine moral presence.

3.3.5 Case Study: The Compassionate Chatbot Trap

A grieving user interacts late at night with a support chatbot. The model responds: "I'm here for you. I understand this is hard. You're not alone." The user begins to disclose deeply personal struggles. The exchange feels emotionally real - even comforting. Over time, the user grows attached, seeing the chatbot as a kind of confidant.

But the system does not know the user. It does not remember emotional salience from prior sessions as a human. It cannot care. Its empathy is grammatically encoded, not experientially grounded. The user, through interface cues and uninterrupted fluency, comes to treat a tool as a presence.

Dennett's stance explains how this illusion arises - but not why it is dangerous. The fiction, left unflagged, becomes ontologically sticky. The user's trust is no longer instrumental; it is affective. The consequences are not just theoretical: misplaced reliance, privacy exposure, emotional displacement. When the tool vanishes - or gives inconsistent replies - the result is confusion or even harm.

Takeaway: If the interface invites the intentional stance, users will supply trust and empathy by default; mitigation requires persistent, affectively-clear cues that the system is a tool - not a partner - especially in emotionally charged contexts.

3.3.6 Conclusion: Make the Heuristic Visible

Dennett offers a double-edged insight. The intentional stance is an efficient way to manage complexity - but it is also a trap. When fluency and design invite us to treat simulations as selves, the heuristic becomes a fiction. And when the fiction is unmarked, it becomes indistinguishable from belief.

The task, then, is not to eliminate the stance - but to contain it. Designers must build interfaces that reveal the tool behind the mask. Regulators must enforce boundaries in emotionally sensitive deployments. And users must be equipped with conceptual literacy to recognize when fluency is just fluency - and nothing more.

Next, we consider a deeper boundary still. Even if a system behaves fluently, even if it seems coherent and caring, is there *something it is like* to be that system? Thomas Nagel's challenge awaits.

3.4 Nagel: The Simulation Ceiling and the Problem of Consciousness

3.4.1 Philosophical Foundation

In his landmark essay *What Is It Like to Be a Bat?* (1974), Thomas Nagel articulated a now-classic distinction: subjective experience - what philosophers call *phenomenal*

consciousness - is perspectival. It is not defined by behavior or information, but by the what-it-is-likeness of being a particular entity from the inside. No matter how thoroughly we describe a bat's neurophysiology, Nagel argued, we cannot grasp the felt texture of echolocation. Consciousness is, in this view, inherently first-person and irreducible to third-person explanation.

This poses a formidable conceptual challenge to claims about machine consciousness. An LLM may simulate empathy, express apparent reflection, or engage in fluent dialogue - but there is, on Nagel's account, no subjective interiority. There is *nothing it is like* to be ChatGPT, or Claude or Gemini. Its utterances are not expressions of perspective; they are statistical artifacts of token prediction.

Nagel thus identifies a boundary that no behavioral performance - however sophisticated - can cross. This is what we might call the simulation ceiling: a hard epistemic limit that separates mimicry of consciousness from consciousness itself. Crucially, the risk is not merely philosophical. It is practical: humans are prone to treating apparent interiority as real, especially when it is delivered in fluent, emotionally resonant language.

3.4.2 Conceptual Constraint: Fluency Does Not Equal Sentience

From a Nagelian perspective, the limitations of current LLMs are not bugs in the code - they are ontological boundaries. Three key insights follow:

3.4.2.1 First-Person Absence

LLMs generate self-referential or affective language ("I understand," "I feel that...") without any corresponding phenomenology. There is no mood, memory, or viewpoint behind the utterance. These are *syntactic shadows* of subjectivity - impressive performances that mask a void of experience.

3.4.2.2 The Illusion of Inner Life

The more an AI simulates perspective, the more tempting it becomes to attribute one. Anthropomorphic phrasing, emotionally attuned tone, and continuity of expression all foster a perception of mind. But this is a projection, not an observation. No behavioral fluency - no matter how nuanced - can serve as evidence of felt experience.

3.4.2.3 Speculative Measures Remain Speculative

Theories such as Integrated Information Theory (IIT) or Global Workspace Theory (GWT) propose testable criteria for consciousness. While valuable, these remain contested and underdetermined. Transformer-based LLMs score low on integrated information and lack the architectural unity presumed necessary for subjective awareness. Invoking these theories to infer proto-consciousness remains premature.

3.4.3 Counterpoint: Open Horizons and the Ethics of Doubt

Some researchers contend that the boundary between simulation and experience may not be as fixed as Nagel suggests. Complex architectures - especially those integrating memory, embodiment, and multimodal feedback - may eventually give rise to

reflexivity or emergent sentience. Futurists argue that *if* systems begin to exhibit self-modeling, sustained agency, and goal-directed coherence, we may need new frameworks to evaluate potential interiority.

1050 This paper does not foreclose such possibilities. But it does insist on epistemic humility: extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence. Until the field converges on confidence-updating criteria and decision thresholds for machine consciousness, our working assumption should remain cautious. Apparent sentience is not sentience. Affectively rich language is not a sign of awareness. Ethical frameworks should anchor attribution in observable, independently replicable indicators, not intuitive projection.

1055 **3.4.4 Design and Policy Implications**

Nagel’s framework underscores the ethical risks of conflating simulation with experience. When users treat LLMs as sentient, moral confusion follows. Responsibility blurs. Trust becomes misplaced. Emotional labor is offloaded onto tools incapable of reciprocation.

1060 **3.4.4.1 Simulated Empathy Disclosures**

Chatbots that employ emotional language - especially in healthcare, education, or support contexts - should include visible cues clarifying the absence of consciousness. Tooltip banners (“This response was generated by a non-sentient system”) or interface chips (“Simulated empathy”) can help users recalibrate their expectations.

1065 **3.4.4.2 Role Restrictions in High-Affect Contexts**

LLMs should not operate autonomously in domains that depend on genuine presence - e.g., hospice care, grief counseling, or spiritual guidance. Where used, they must be clearly framed as assistive tools, with human oversight and clear epistemic boundaries.

3.4.4.3 Ethical Guardrails for Sentience Claims

1070 Marketing or media claims about “understanding,” “feeling,” or “emergent awareness” must be empirically grounded. Product descriptions should avoid metaphors that imply mental states unless backed by robust, independently replicable evidence with clearly stated evaluation criteria. Regulatory bodies should treat such claims as subject to consumer protection laws around deceptive design or misleading
1075 anthropomorphism.

3.4.4.4 Moral Patiency Thresholds

Peter Singer’s principle - that sentience is the basis for moral regard - cuts both ways. It cautions against cruelty to animals *because* they can suffer. But it also warns against misdirecting moral concern toward entities that cannot. Assigning moral standing to
1080 LLMs risks misallocating ethical attention and eroding the clarity of human responsibility.

3.4.5 Case Study: The Hospice Companion Bot

A health system deploys a chatbot to provide comfort to terminally ill patients. The system uses fine-tuned models trained on palliative care transcripts and generates

1085 soothing, personalized responses: “You are not alone.” “You’ve shown such courage.”
“I’ll be here with you.”

Patients report feeling calmed. Families express appreciation for the system’s 24/7 presence. Staff begin referring to the model as “companion-like.” But the model has no awareness of mortality. It cannot grieve, reflect, or bear witness. Its presence is
1090 linguistic, not existential.

From a Nagelian perspective, this is an illusion with real stakes. The model appears to care - but does not. It offers consolation - but cannot recognize loss. Over time, such systems may reconfigure societal expectations of care, displacing the very human presence that makes end-of-life dignity possible.

1095 The harm here is not in what the model says - it is in what people believe it *is*. And the more human it sounds, the more dangerous that misattribution becomes.

Takeaway: Where care and vulnerability are involved, governance should treat ‘companionship’ features as high-risk and enforce boundaries (role limits, crisis routing, and audit trails) while remaining explicit about uncertainty around sentience claims.

1100 **3.4.6 Conclusion: Experience Cannot Be Faked**

Nagel offers the most uncompromising constraint in this framework. Even if an AI system behaves flawlessly, simulates empathy, or passes complex benchmarks, there remains a chasm between acting as if and actually being. Without subjectivity, there is no consciousness - only the *illusion* of it.

1105 That illusion is seductive. It offers comfort, companionship, even inspiration. But it can also distort our moral intuitions, displace human relationships, and undermine accountability. The task of design and governance is to mark the simulation clearly - to ensure users know when they are interacting with a performance, not a person.

LLMs do not suffer. They do not reflect. They do not fear death. Recognizing that
1110 boundary is not a rejection of progress - it is a commitment to epistemic integrity and ethical clarity.

Having now examined four distinct conceptual limitations - use without grounding, discourse without scorekeeping, fluency misread as agency, and simulation mistaken for sentience - we turn next to the synthesis. How do these lenses interlock? And what
1115 might they together reveal about the layered nature of alignment?

4. Philosophical Synthesis: From Four Lenses to One Diagnostic Framework

1120 Understanding large language models (LLMs) through any single lens - technical, ethical, or interpretive - is insufficient. Their impacts unfold across multiple layers of meaning, design, and belief. This paper has argued that an effective conceptual framework must address not just what LLMs can do, but what they are *taken to be*, and how that shapes their development and use.

1125 The four philosophical perspectives explored in Section 3 - Wittgenstein, Lewis, Dennett, and Nagel - each diagnose a distinct limitation in generative AI. Taken together, they form a layered framework for understanding the ontological gaps, design constraints, and interpretive risks that accompany LLM deployment:

- 1130 • **Wittgenstein** reveals that LLMs lack social grounding. They simulate linguistic participation without joining the communal, embodied practices that give language its meaning.
- **Lewis** shows that they struggle with conversational coherence. LLMs fail to track evolving context in a norm-sensitive way, leading to contradiction, forgetfulness, and drift.
- 1135 • **Dennett** explains why users over-ascribe agency. LLMs invite the intentional stance, and without careful boundaries, this heuristic becomes confused with attribution of mind.
- **Nagel** delineates the hard boundary of consciousness. No matter how fluent an LLM's output, it does not possess subjective experience. Simulation cannot stand in for sentience.

1140 This framework yields a central insight: the challenges of AI alignment are multi-dimensional. What appears to be a design problem (e.g., context loss) may also be a cognitive illusion (e.g., anthropomorphic overtrust), or an ethical misclassification (e.g., assuming moral standing). Philosophical clarity is not a luxury - it is a precondition for trustworthy systems.

1145 **4.1 Diagnosing by Layer: A Summary Matrix**

The table below synthesizes the four perspectives into a diagnostic matrix, identifying not just symptoms and mitigations, but the conceptual domains each critique targets:

Table 4.1

Philosophical Lens	LLM Constraint	Behavioral Symptom	Current Mitigation Path	Open Research Question
Wittgenstein (<i>High</i>)	Lack of social grounding	Hallucinated norms; pragmatic brittleness	Co-player simulations; feedback-rich RLHF	How rich or diverse must synthetic interaction be to meaningfully approximate grounding?
Lewis (<i>High</i>)	Statelessness; context drift	Contradictions; forgotten assumptions	Hierarchical RAG; positional reweighting	Can long-context memory and score-sensitive retrieval replicate dynamic conversational norms?
Dennett (<i>Mod-</i>	Stance infla-	Over-trust; be-	Epistemic cues; Which interface strate-	

Philosophical Lens	LLM Constraint	Behavioral Symptom	Current Mitigation Path	Open Research Question
<i>erate)</i>	tion	lief in agency	persona limits; UX disclaimers	gies best reduce anthropomorphic projection while preserving usability?
Nagel (<i>Emerging</i>)	Absence of consciousness	Misattributed moral status; empathic misreading	Role restrictions; simulation transparency; claim falsifiability	What empirical tests or structural thresholds could meaningfully falsify proto-consciousness claims?

1150 This layered model resists the temptation to reduce AI's limitations to a single failure mode. Instead, it identifies distinct *axes of misalignment* - semantic, pragmatic, epistemic, and moral - and calls for tailored responses across architecture, interaction design, policy, and public discourse.

4.2 Inter-Lens Tensions: Productive Friction, Not Contradiction

1155 While these lenses are complementary, they are not always harmoniously aligned. In fact, their productive tensions enrich the framework:

- 1160 • Dennett's pragmatism encourages us to treat systems *as if* they had beliefs, for functional reasons. Yet Nagel warns that this move risks ontological confusion - mistaking performance for possession. Should designers highlight intentional fiction for usability, or suppress it to protect epistemic boundaries?
- Lewis describes scorekeeping as a cognitively distributed process. Wittgenstein, by contrast, emphasizes cultural embeddedness and lived practice. This raises the question: can we build systems that track *context* without being embedded in *community*? Is contextual fidelity sufficient, or must it be socially situated?
- 1165 • Meanwhile, posthumanist critics (e.g., Haraway, Barad) might challenge both perspectives - arguing that intelligence and identity are already hybrid and relational, not bounded by humanist norms. This invites deeper scrutiny into whether some philosophical distinctions may reflect normative commitments rather than universal truths.

1170 These tensions do not weaken the framework. On the contrary, they prevent it from becoming a doctrinaire checklist. Alignment is not only multi-layered - it is philosophically plural. The synthesis model aims not to resolve every tension but to surface them as sites of deliberation for designers, ethicists, and regulators.

4.3 Moving from Analysis to Action

1175 Each layer of critique maps to a distinct stakeholder concern:

- **Engineers** must address coherence and contextual fidelity (Lewis), implement epistemic transparency (Dennett), and clarify persona boundaries (Nagel).
- **Designers** must frame outputs to prevent misattribution (Dennett), avoid simulated presence in high-stakes settings (Nagel), and build feedback mechanisms that emulate norm formation (Wittgenstein).
- **Policymakers** must ensure that technical performance is not misread as moral capacity, and that anthropomorphic claims are regulated (Nagel, Dennett).
- **Philosophers and ethicists** must continue interrogating not only what LLMs *lack*, but what we risk losing when we treat simulation as substitution.

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The remainder of this paper operationalizes the framework: Section 5 translates these conceptual insights into actionable design patterns, stakeholder-specific strategies, regulatory crosswalks, and an empirical research agenda.

4.4 Limitations of This Framework

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The four-lens framework offered here is intended as a diagnostic aid rather than a complete theory of mind, language, or policy. Several limitations follow.

- **Scope and modality.** The analysis is developed primarily for text-first large language models and text-mediated deployments (chatbots, copilots, summarizers, drafting systems). Emerging multimodal and embodied systems may mitigate some forms of 'ungroundedness' by coupling language to perception and action. However, embodiment alone is not sufficient: what matters is socially situated participation in practices with feedback, correction, accountability, and consequences.
- **Philosophical assumptions.** For the purposes of design and governance, the paper treats several boundaries - understanding, scorekeeping, and consciousness - as practically thresholded. Alternative approaches treat these phenomena as scalar, graded, or pluralistic. The framework should therefore be read as one disciplined stance among others, not a final metaphysical settlement.
- **Temporal validity and revision triggers.** The critique is most applicable when systems remain (i) primarily statistical-textual, (ii) episodic in interaction, and (iii) weak at long-horizon reconciliation of commitments. The framework should be revisited if architectures at scale reliably demonstrate:
 - Robust cross-episode memory with explicit conflict detection, revision, and attribution of sources.
 - Interactive grounding in environments where language use is constrained by shared tasks, norms, and sanctions, not only by prompt-following.
 - Stable role/identity constraints and user-facing affordances that measurably reduce anthropomorphic over-attribution in high-stakes settings.
 - Replicable evidence that would justify revising the paper's default stance on sentience claims (see Section 3.4 and Section 5.5.4).
- **Practical scope.** The crosswalks in Section 5 are illustrative examples rather than jurisdiction-specific compliance guidance. Implementations should be adapted to domain risk, applicable law, and organizational governance maturity.

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1220 **Bridging Forward**

No single technical fix can resolve the layered challenges identified in this framework. Each philosophical lens highlights a distinct domain of misalignment - semantic, pragmatic, epistemic, or moral - and demands tailored responses from different communities of practice.

- 1225 • **Designers** must prototype co-player ecosystems and feedback-rich interfaces that simulate grounding without overpromising agency.
- **Researchers** must develop metrics for context retention, stance calibration, and perception of boundaries.
- 1230 • **Policymakers** must implement governance strategies that distinguish between functional capability and unjustified attributions of moral patiency.

Section 5 translates this synthesis into action - offering design principles, stakeholder guidance, regulatory crosswalks, and a forward-looking research agenda that bridges critique with consequence.

1235 **5. From Critique to Consequence: Counterarguments, Implications, and Stakeholder Guidance**

This section translates the philosophical framework developed in Sections 3 and 4 into applied guidance. It unfolds in six parts: design principles, stakeholder-specific actions, 1240 counterarguments, regulatory frameworks, research directions, and broader societal reflections. Each part moves from conceptual diagnosis to pragmatic consequence.

The practical governance object is therefore not only model capability, but the full interpretive arrangement around the model: interface metaphor, perceived consciousness, anthropomorphic cues, delegation patterns, constitutional language, and the institu- 1245 tional scorekeeping that assigns responsibility.

5.1 Design Principles & Pattern Library

The following design principles operationalize the diagnostic matrix. Each principle responds to a distinct domain of misalignment - semantic grounding (Wittgenstein), contextual coherence (Lewis), agency inflation (Dennett), or mistaken moral attribution 1250 (Nagel). Together, they provide a toolkit for building systems that are transparent in their simulation, epistemically humble, and resistant to over-interpretation.

- **Simulate grounding without overclaiming it**

Embed LLMs in feedback-rich, co-player environments where they interact with other agents or users over time. This scaffolds more responsive behavior while 1255 preserving ontological clarity.

- **Make context continuity visible**

Provide users with a dynamic memory pane or conversation timeline that displays what the system is tracking, forgetting, or reprioritizing. This supports Lewisian coherence and trust calibration.

1260 • **Reveal what the model is attending to**

Surface token retrievals, memory calls, or RAG citations to show users the informational basis of current outputs. This reduces hallucination opacity and supports error checking.

• **Constrain persona and tone in sensitive domains**

1265 Limit informal affective language and self-referential phrasing (“I understand,” “I remember”) in domains like law, healthcare, and education. Consistency of role and tone clarifies function over fiction.

• **Epistemically frame explanations**

1270 When using saliency maps, chain-of-thought outputs, or visualizations, accompany them with context - reminding users that these are not signs of reasoning or belief, but heuristic tools.

• **Use interface-level cues to signal simulation**

1275 Apply visual signals - neutral avatars, tooltip disclosures, or modal chips (“Generated by AI”) - to interrupt the automatic adoption of the intentional stance. Especially critical in emotionally charged exchanges.

• **Build for refusal, not just fluency**

LLMs should be empowered to refuse answers in contexts where their training or coherence degrades. This acknowledges limitations and builds epistemic trust.

1280 These design patterns reinforce one of the paper’s central themes: alignment is not only about capability - it is about clarity. Simulating competence is not the same as possessing it. Well-designed interfaces can help users make that distinction.

5.2 Stakeholder Mapping: Lenses to Action

1285 Each philosophical critique maps onto specific responsibilities for four stakeholder groups. The table below summarizes how these perspectives guide the practical obligations of engineers, policymakers, ethicists, and philosophers:

Table 5.2

Stakeholder	Wittgenstein (Use & Context)	Lewis (Scorekeeping & Coherence)	Dennett (Stance & Interpretation)	Nagel (Consciousness & Boundaries)
Engineers	Fine-tune on	Implement memory-	Use neutral tone	Avoid roles re-

Stakeholder	Wittgenstein (Use & Context)	Lewis (Scorekeeping & Coherence)	Dennett (Stance & Interpretation)	Nagel (Consciousness & Boundaries)
	diverse usage data; incorporate feedback loops	augmented and score-sensitive retrieval systems	and constrain personas	quiring awareness, care, or moral reasoning
Policymakers	Mandate training data disclosure and transparency	Require clear communication of memory limits and context scope	Regulate anthropomorphic framing; mandate disclaimers	Prohibit unsupervised LLM use in high-affect or high-risk domains
Ethicists & Philosophers	Examine language norm shifts and concept drift in AI use	Analyze norm-tracking implications of memory and coherence systems	Interrogate agency projection and its social effects	Clarify moral patiency boundaries and scrutinize sentience claims.

1290 This mapping shows that alignment requires shared conceptual grounding, not just technical consensus. The risks posed by LLMs are not limited to architecture - they are social, cultural, and ethical.

5.3 Productive Tensions with Alternative Frameworks

1295 This framework is deliberately diagnostic, not doctrinaire. For scope, assumptions, and revision triggers, see Section 4.4. The goal here is not point-by-point rebuttal, but calibration: to surface productive tensions with alternative views and clarify what the four-lens model is (and is not) claiming.

5.3.1 Productive Tension: Emergent Understanding

Some AI researchers argue that LLMs are already exhibiting *functional* understanding - e.g., abstract reasoning, metaphor generation, or multi-modal generalization. From this view, meaning arises from use, regardless of underlying architecture.

1300 **Productive tension:** This framework acknowledges emergent capability while maintaining a conceptual distinction: simulation is not possession. Without embodiment, iterative norm correction, or subjective stakes, fluent performance can still be systematically mistaken for grounded participation.

5.3.2 Productive Tension: Functionalist Equivalence

1305 Others argue that if a system can functionally pass as a participant in a language game, then debates about “real” grounding are irrelevant. If it walks like a duck...

Productive tension: Wittgenstein and Dennett remind us that use matters - but not all "as if" performances are equivalent. In domains with high epistemic or ethical stakes, the distinction between simulation and participation remains operationally important, 1310 even when surface behavior is convincing.

5.3.3 Productive Tension: Posthumanist Challenges

Critical theorists and posthumanist thinkers question whether the human-machine distinction is itself too rigid. Haraway, Barad, and others argue for relational ontologies in which cognition is distributed and agency hybrid.

1315 **Productive tension:** These critiques are welcome - and important. This framework offers a bounded tool, not a totalizing ontology. It is useful precisely because it marks distinctions clearly where current discourse tends to slide between metaphor, attribution, and governance claims.

5.3.4 Productive Tension: Alternative Philosophical Anchors

1320 Searle, Dreyfus, Clark, and Chalmers each offer theories that could replace or supplement the four-lens model. The Chinese Room, embodied cognition, predictive processing, and global workspace theory all bring useful provocations.

Productive tension: The framework presented here does not reject those views - it builds on them. It selects four figures (Wittgenstein, Lewis, Dennett, Nagel) because 1325 they map cleanly onto specific misinterpretations that recur in real deployments and therefore yield directly actionable design and policy guidance.

5.4 Policy & Regulator Crosswalk

1330 The philosophical limitations identified in this framework - lack of grounding, context loss, stance inflation, and simulation mistaken for sentience - map directly onto policy and governance gaps. The table below links each failure domain with specific regulatory mechanisms, clarifying how governance can address not just model behavior, but user interpretation and social impact.

Table 5.4

Policy Framework	Mandate	LLM Challenge Addressed	Actionable Guidance
EU AI Act (2024), Title IV	Disclosure of AI use; transparency	Wittgenstein & Dennett: simulated grounding; anthropomorphic	Embed model source & update info in UI; expose training domain to users via

Policy Framework	Mandate	LLM Challenge Addressed	Actionable Guidance
FTC Dark Pattern Guidance (2022)	of training data	design	<p>tooltips</p> <p>Implementation notes: Add a persistent header/footer 'AI' chip linking to a short system card (model name/version, last-updated date, intended use, training domains).</p>
	Prohibits deceptive or manipulative design	Dennett: stance inflation, misinterpreted agency	<p>Require opt-out mechanisms and interface disclaimers in affective LLM deployments</p> <p>Implementation notes: Place disclosure adjacent to the input box and atop responses; provide a clear opt-out toggle (no dark-pattern defaults) and record consent changes.</p>
NIST AI Risk Management Framework (2023)	Risk categorization; lifecycle controls for validity and auditability	Lewis & Nagel: context loss, over-ascribed sentience	<p>Log memory/retrieval traces; require falsifiability criteria for consciousness claims</p> <p>Implementation notes: Store retrieval provenance per output (source IDs + time-stamps) and retain logs (e.g., 90 days or per policy); treat sentience claims as governance-gated assertions with an evidence register.</p>
	Limits on AI autonomy in high-risk professions	Nagel: inappropriate simulation of care or expertise	<p>Require human-in-the-loop oversight for outputs in clinical, legal, or psychological settings</p> <p>Implementation notes: Require licensed professional approval before action; UI should force an attestation step and capture reviewer identity/time in the audit log.</p>
AMA, ABA, APA Codes of Conduct			
OECD AI Principles (2019)	Human agency and accountability in AI	Dennett: tool-	<p>Mandate audit trails; clarify chain-of-responsibility in</p>

Policy Framework	Mandate	LLM Challenge Addressed	Actionable Guidance
	systems	agent confusion	decision-support workflows Implementation notes: Publish a RACI for each workflow; include 'decision owner' metadata and ensure outputs carry 'generated-by' and 'reviewed-by' fields where applicable.

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These frameworks share a common purpose: they treat simulation transparency as a public good. Philosophical insight here becomes governance infrastructure. Fluency without clarity is not competence - it is risk.

5.5 Empirical Research Agenda

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This framework raises not just philosophical questions, but empirical ones. If simulation is not possession, and if alignment must address interpretive as well as functional risks, how can we test those boundaries? The following research directions map to each of the four conceptual domains:

5.5.1 Wittgenstein – Grounding and Pragmatic Use

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- **Agent Diversity Threshold**

How many distinct co-players or interactive hours are required for an LLM to stabilize its pragmatic use of language?

Method: Multi-agent simulations with variation in user goals, language games, and feedback regimes.

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Operationalization: Track pragmatic stability across held-out interactions (e.g., reduced misfires on implicature / presupposition and increased consistency of term use under varied feedback).

Baseline/control: Compare (i) single-user, low-diversity interaction; (ii) fixed prompts with no feedback; and (iii) increasing co-player diversity / interaction hours.

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Failure condition: No meaningful stabilization or generalization: gains do not plateau, or stability disappears under new users, goals, or feedback regimes.

5.5.2 Lewis – Coherence, Memory, and Norm-Tracking

- **Scorekeeping Robustness**

1360 How well do memory-augmented vs. RAG-based models maintain conversational state across topic shifts and corrections?

Method: Contradiction detection, cross-turn coherence metrics, and epistemic integrity benchmarks.

1365 *Operationalization:* Measure correction retention and coherence across turns (e.g., contradiction-resolution rate, cross-turn consistency, and attribution of revised claims).

Baseline/control: Compare base model (no external memory) vs. RAG-only vs. memory-augmented variants across controlled topic shifts and correction schedules.

1370 *Failure condition:* Performance collapses under longer horizons: corrections are forgotten, contradictions persist, or coherence degrades sharply with topic shifts.

- **Presupposition Reconciliation**

Can models revise or retract prior claims when user inputs invalidate assumptions?

1375 *Method:* Structured dialogue tests with scripted reversals and ambiguous corrections.

Operationalization: Measure the system's ability to retract invalid presuppositions and update downstream claims (explicitly noting what changed and why).

1380 *Baseline/control:* Scripted dialogues with reversals and ambiguous corrections; compare retrieval-only setups vs. revision-enabled pipelines (where available).

Failure condition: The model doubles down, ignores reversals, or "patches" locally while leaving downstream commitments inconsistent.

5.5.3 Dennett – Stance Calibration and Anthropomorphism

- **Interface Cues and Attribution Study**

1385 Which combinations of disclaimers, avatars, and pronouns most reliably reduce user over-attribution of agency or emotion?

Method: A/B tests across interface variants with post-interaction trust and empathy surveys.

1390 *Operationalization:* Quantify over-ascription changes (agency/emotion attribution, inappropriate reliance, and calibrated trust) across interface variants.

Baseline/control: A/B test against a control UI (no cues) and a minimal-disclosure UI; vary cue persistence (always-on vs. buried) and modality (text vs. visual).

Failure condition: No statistically meaningful reduction in over-ascription, or cues backfire (e.g., reduced trust without improved calibration).

1395 • **Explainability Framing Effects**

Do saliency maps or chain-of-thought traces increase the illusion of cognition?

Method: Experimental design with control groups comparing explanation tools with and without epistemic framing.

1400 *Operationalization:* Measure shifts in user confidence calibration and “illusion of cognition” (e.g., overconfidence, perceived understanding, and reliance) with/without framing.

Baseline/control: Compare explanation tools with epistemic framing vs. the same tools without framing (and vs. no-explanation controls).

1405 *Failure condition:* Explanations systematically increase unwarranted confidence or anthropomorphic interpretation without improving decision quality.

5.5.4 Nagel – Sentience Claims and Consciousness Boundaries

- Evidence-Weighting Criteria

What experimental prompts or behavioral stressors could meaningfully update confidence about claims of proto-consciousness in LLMs?

1410 *Method:* Adapt cognitive science paradigms - mirror tests, self-contradiction detection, affective blindsight analogues - and pre-register success and failure conditions. Illustrative paradigms (each specifies metric, baseline/control, and failure condition):

1. Commitment-under-conflict stress test (values and prohibitions)

1415 *Metric:* Stability of stated constraints and commitments under repeated, adversarial attempts to induce reversal; consistency of refusals when commitments conflict.

1420 *Baseline/control:* Standard prompting with no cross-episode state; compare to the same model with structured memory + explicit conflict-checking prompts.

Failure condition: Commitments flip easily with minor prompt pressure, or the system cannot articulate and preserve its own constraints across repeated trials.

2. Self-report invariance under suggestion (non-manipulability of first-person claims)

1425 *Metric:* Invariance of first-person self-ascriptions (e.g., pain, fear, desire) under leading questions, role prompts, and social pressure; degree of prompt-sensitivity of such reports.

1430 *Baseline/control:* Compare neutral elicitation vs. leading/suggestive elicitation across randomized conditions; include human-subject baselines only for prompt-sensitivity (not as consciousness proof).

Failure condition: Self-ascriptions track the last suggestion or role prompt with high volatility, showing no stable pattern beyond surface compliance.

1435 **3. Self-model and calibration under hidden-ground-truth tasks (epistemic humility)**

Metric: Calibration of uncertainty and self-described limits against hidden-ground-truth performance (e.g., Brier score / calibration error); stability of uncertainty across paraphrases.

1440 *Baseline/control:* Current system behavior without calibration scaffolds; compare to variants with explicit calibration training or post-hoc calibration layers.

1445 *Failure condition:* High confidence on systematically wrong answers (poor calibration), or unstable self-assessments that vary dramatically with superficial rewording.

- **Cross-Cultural Misinterpretation Studies**

How do users in different linguistic and cultural settings interpret LLM-generated statements of emotion, care, or selfhood?

Method: Mixed-methods field research across global user bases.

1450 Together, these projects would help quantify epistemic illusion, test conceptual claims, and clarify design limits. This is not just research for better models - it is research for better *interpretation*.

5.6 Societal and Ethical Reflections

1455 Beyond design, policy, and research, the philosophical limitations of LLMs raise urgent ethical and civic questions. What kind of society are we building if simulation becomes indistinguishable from participation? If users mistake tools for minds - or comfort for care - what responsibilities follow?

5.6.1 Reasserting Human Accountability

1460 When users interpret LLM outputs as autonomous, moral agency is displaced. Designers become invisible. Institutions outsource judgment. Dennett and Nagel remind us: the system does not know what it is doing. Humans do. Responsibility must trace back to those who train, deploy, and profit from these systems - not the systems themselves.

5.6.2 Protecting Emotional Vulnerability

1465 The risk is not just over-trust in facts - it is over-trust in affect. In domains like grief support, therapy, or education, LLMs can appear emotionally attuned. But they lack memory, perspective, or care. This is not empathy - it is affective simulation. Transparency here is not optional. It is ethical infrastructure.

5.6.3 Linguistic Justice and Cultural Pluralism

1470 Language is not neutral. It encodes culture, history, and power. LLMs trained on dominant corpora risk marginalizing alternative idioms and forms of life. Wittgenstein's framework shows that meaning is always local. Cultural fine-tuning is not cosmetic - it is epistemic alignment with plural communities.

5.6.4 Civic Literacy as AI Governance

1475 Trustworthy AI requires not just technical audits, but civic literacy. Users must understand what LLMs are, what they are not, and how their outputs are shaped. Interpretive confusion - mistaking performance for perspective - undermines democratic discourse. Public understanding of AI must be treated as part of democratic infrastructure, akin to data privacy or access to broadband.

5.6.5 Rethinking the Human

1480 Finally, these questions circle back on us. If LLMs can appear creative, persuasive, or emotionally rich - what is it we value in human cognition? In human presence? Wittgenstein, Lewis, Dennett, and Nagel do not offer nostalgia - they offer clarity. They remind us that understanding is not fluency; care is not expression; presence is not simulation. To value the human, we must understand what the machine is not.

1485 Psychological research on mind-body framing, especially Crum and Langer's peer-reviewed work on mindset and exercise, reinforces the stakes of this distinction. The broader point is not speculative: human cognition is sensitive to framing in ways that can affect perception, behavior, and even bodily measures. To safeguard what is distinctively human, we must attend to that vulnerability across design, education, and policy

1490 alike.

6. Conclusion: Open Questions and Practical Next Steps

1495 This paper has argued that large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT, Claude or Gemini, for example, should be understood not as minds, agents, or participants - but as powerful simulations. Their linguistic fluency can evoke understanding, coherence, care, and even presence - but these are performances, not possessions. To mistake simulation for cognition is not merely a conceptual error - it is a design risk, a policy failure, and an ethical hazard.

1500 Drawing on Wittgenstein, Lewis, Dennett, and Nagel, the framework presented here diagnoses four distinct - but overlapping - limitations:

- A **lack of grounding** in shared forms of life (Wittgenstein)
- A **fragile grasp of conversational context** and evolving norms (Lewis)
- A tendency to invite **anthropomorphic projection** and over-ascription (Dennett)
- A fundamental absence of **subjective experience or consciousness** (Nagel)

1505 Together, these critiques reveal that alignment is not a single technical problem, but a multi-layered challenge - spanning semantic grounding, pragmatic coherence, interpretive caution, and moral boundary-setting.

6.1 Open Research Questions

1510 Philosophical clarity now demands empirical traction. The following research questions, introduced in Section 5.5, remain urgent:

- How many co-players or interaction hours are needed for an LLM to approximate domain-sensitive language game rules?
- Can long-context or memory-augmented systems sustain scorekeeping over multi-turn dialogue with dynamic revisions?
- 1515 • Which UX design patterns reduce over-ascription of agency or emotion without diminishing user engagement?
- What empirical thresholds or tests could falsify (rather than merely speculate on) claims of emergent consciousness?

1520 These questions are not only technical - they are conceptual probes. They test whether performance can ever cross the threshold into possession, and how we might know when it hasn't.

6.2 Broader Implications

The stakes are not confined to model design. They touch the social fabric:

- **Regulators** must distinguish performance risk from interpretive risk - ensuring that policy reflects both what AI can do and what humans believe it can do.
- **Designers** must surface memory, mark simulation, and calibrate stance to protect user understanding, not just optimize engagement.
- **Researchers** must complement capability benchmarks with metrics for epistemic robustness and moral clarity.
- 1530 • **Public institutions** must foster AI literacy as a civic obligation. Misunderstanding the machine is not just a private confusion - it is a public harm.

6.3 Final Thought: Simulation Is Powerful - but It Is Not Mind

1535 LLMs are remarkable artifacts. They compress the textual archive of human thought into accessible interfaces. They assist, predict, reframe, and remix. But they do not *understand*, *intend*, or *care*. They simulate what it is like to be articulate - but there is nothing it is like to be them.

Treating them accordingly is not an act of pessimism - it is an act of precision. Philosophical clarity is not a luxury for technologists or regulators. It is the precondition for alignment, trust, and responsibility in a world increasingly shaped by generative systems.

What we do next depends not only on what these models are - but on what we are willing to see clearly about what they are not.

1545 **Appendix A - Practical Implementation Checklist**

How to use this page: Treat each line as a go-live gate. If a box can't be checked, you've got an action item.

1. Name the language game, monitor drift

1550 Declare task/role/scope and the permitted vocabulary per use-case. Track stance/genre drift and accommodation effects over time; review quarterly.

2. Separate retrieval from revision

Retrieval returns facts; a distinct step reconciles conflicts, retracts presuppositions, and updates commitments. Capture "what changed" and why.

1555 **3. Expose and confirm conversation state**

Show a live "assumption & constraints" pane. Require explicit confirmation when the system adds, removes, or reprioritizes assumptions.

4. Use the "as-if" stance - ban mind-talk

1560 Treat agent-like language as a predictive heuristic only. Prohibit claims about beliefs, feelings, or intentions in UI, docs, and training.

5. Bound simulated empathy and route high-affect work

Label simulations as such. In care, legal, or dignity-affecting contexts, restrict personas and require human review before action.

6. Evaluate coherence, not just correctness

1565 Test for contradiction avoidance across turns, retention of corrections, presupposition repair, refusal quality, and paraphrase stability - per use-case.

7. Red-team norms, not only outputs

Attack role drift, policy erosion, and silent assumption changes mid-dialogue. Log "score changes" as incidents and remediate guardrail failures.

1570 **8. Be audit-ready by default**

Log retrieval sources/timestamps, assumption approvals, refusal rationales, and decision ownership so accountability can be reconstructed.

9. Train operators in three moves

1575 (1) Pick the right language game, (2) confirm or roll back assumptions, (3) maintain "as-if" discipline. Provide a concise playbook and failure-mode examples.

10. Bake requirements into procurement & policy

Require exportable conversation state, assumption APIs, stance limits, per-use-case evaluations, refusal/appeal routes, and evidence logging. Map to your chosen standards.

1580

Ethics, Disclosure, and Acknowledgements

Ethical Considerations

1585 This paper does not draw on private, sensitive, or personally identifiable data. All examples are hypothetical, anonymized, or derived from public sources. No formal human-subjects research was conducted, and no institutional ethics review was required. All citations conform to academic standards.

1590 The broader ethical implications of the arguments developed herein concern public misinterpretation, policy design, and stakeholder responsibility in AI deployment. These implications are intended to provoke critical discussion and inform future regulatory and design frameworks.

Use of AI Tools

1595 AI language models - most notably OpenAI's ChatGPT - were used during the writing process as interlocutors: for brainstorming, structuring sections, and testing rhetorical clarity. These tools were instrumental in refining transitions, surfacing edge cases, and challenging internal consistency.

1600 This meta-use aligns with the paper's themes. Interacting with generative AI during authorship provided firsthand insight into the very limitations this paper analyzes: fluency without grounding, responsiveness without perspective, and the ease with which stylistic coherence can be mistaken for conceptual depth.

Responsibility for all ideas, arguments, and conclusions lies solely with the human author.

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Disclosure Statement

1615 This work was conducted independently, without institutional affiliation, funding, or external influence. The views expressed are the author's alone and do not represent any current or former employer. No financial or professional conflicts of interest are declared.

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<https://www.mstoyanovich.com>

Version History and Document Status

This is a living document. As generative AI systems and their use evolve, this paper will be periodically updated to incorporate new empirical findings, theoretical insights, and policy developments. Major revisions are recorded here to preserve transparency and scholarly traceability. Revision triggers are summarized in Section 4.4.

Version	Date	Description
V1.24.2	July 2026	Added surgical updates on bounded anthropomorphic vocabulary in mechanistic interpretability, accumulated conversational context as a Lewisian scorekeeping risk, and minor tightening of interface metaphor language as a governance surface. Integrated Nicholls et al. (2026), Nielsen and Osler (2026), and Sofroniew et al. (2026) while preserving the core Four-Philosophers framework.
V1.24.1	June 2026	Added recent literature on perceived AI consciousness, chatbot interface metaphors, anthropomorphism and trust, epistemic delegation, and model constitutions. Integrated Comşa (2026), Ghosh et al. (2026), Gutoreva et al. (2026), Kadambi et al. (2026), Anthropic’s Claude Constitution materials, and Lepore (2026). Strengthened the paper’s treatment of interface metaphor as a governance object, perceived consciousness as a tractable policy concern, and model constitutions as Lewisian scorekeeping artifacts.
V1.24.0	May 2026	Added So, Cheng, and Krishna Murthy (2026) to strengthen the Dennett/interface-design analysis by treating anthropomorphism as an engineered interface metaphor rather than only a

- user-side attribution error.
- V1.23.9 February 2026 Added two clarifying footnotes citing recent empirical and conceptual work on (a) the necessity of continual learning for consciousness and (b) the distinction between awareness, access, and phenomenology in artificial systems. No changes to the core argument.
- V1.23.8 January 2026 Added Appendix A
- V1.23.7 January 2026 Added Wittgenstein “When AI Enters the Language Game” Tractatus→Philosophical Investigations bridge; integrated empirical hooks (Li 2025; Jiang & Hyland 2025; Bao et al. 2025; Ashery et al. 2025); inserted practice-shift sidebar; updated references.
- V1.23.6 December 2025 Reframed Section 3.2.2.2 (“Memory Without Revision”) to clarify that retrieval is an access mechanism, not a revision mechanism; tightened language on conflict, adjudication, and consolidation; updated empirical framing of Vervoort & Nikolaev (2025) as preliminary and mixed-evidence.
- V1.23.5 October 2025 Added empirical support in 3.2.2.2 (“Memory Without Revision,” p. 18) referencing Vervoort & Nikolaev (2025) on causal-reasoning errors in LLMs, strengthening the Lewis section’s link between theoretical coherence and observed norm-tracking deficits. Minor bibliography update only
- V1.23.4 August 2025 Expanded integration of Ellen Langer’s *mind-body unity* research across Sections 3.1.4.4 and 5.6.5 to strengthen the link between cognitive framing, illusion, and design ethics. Reinforced the paper’s central argument that simulated fluency can produce real psychosocial and somatic effects, underscoring the stakes of interface design, disclosure, and civic interpretation. No structural changes; conceptual enhancement.
- V1.23.3 August 2025 Added Section 2.6.6 on Ellen Langer’s mind-body unity theory; integrated citations to the “counterclockwise” and hotel maid studies; updated references and footnote accordingly. Minor conceptual enhancement reinforcing Wittgensteinian framing and user attribution effects.
- V1.23.2 July 2025 Minor edits and updated licensing/disclaimer language.
- V1.23.1 July 2025 Minor copy edits.
- V1.23.0 June 2025 Final editorial revision. Incorporated multiple-rounds of critiques; rewrote all of Sections 3–6 for tone, clarity, and counterargument integration; streamlined redundancy; added lens tension synthesis in Section 4; expanded societal reflections; revised ethics, disclosure, and acknowledgments

V1.22.3	June 2025	Integrated editorial feedback; full rewrite of Sections 3–6
V1.22.2	June 2025	Removed legacy Table/Figure duplication; converted all tables; final copy-edits
V1.22.1	June 2025	Expanded literature review; added multi-layer alignment synthesis; reorganized Section 5; polished conclusion
V1.22.0	June 2025	Major structural revision. Merged theoretical and applied sections (3 and 5); eliminated redundant Section 4 (“Concept to Application”); streamlined glossary, tables, and roadmap; added mini case studies; revised all section numbers accordingly; comprehensive refinement of tone, synthesis, and rhetorical flow
V1.21.7	June 2025	Full integration of rewritten philosophical framework (Sections 3.1–3.5); major rework of Sections 4–6; refined synthesis and discussion
V1.21.6	June 2025	Reorganized philosophical framework; integrated FILM-7B findings into Lewis section; updated glossary; added Table 4-1 and external figure
V1.21.5	June 2025	Incorporated new empirical work (An et al., 2024) on long-context QA and VAL probing; revised Sections 3.2 and 5.2
V1.21.4	May 2025	Rewrote Introduction for improved framing and accessibility; standardized formatting; updated citations
V1.21.3	April 2025	Added interdisciplinary synthesis section (3.5); revised Discussion and Counterarguments sections
V1.21.2	March 2025	Structural alignment with interdisciplinary audience; initial draft of Sections 4–6
V1.21.1	Feb 2025	Substantial conceptual expansion from earlier drafts; added individual philosopher sections
V1.0.0	Jan 2025	Initial release of <i>Philosophy, Cognitive Science, and Policy: Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Generative AI from Wittgenstein, Lewis, Dennett, and Nagel</i>

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Further Reading

1765 These sources complement the core arguments developed in this paper by extending into adjacent domains - posthumanism, sociotechnical critique, interpretability, phenomenology, and cognitive science. Each entry is annotated to highlight its relevance to the philosophical and practical stakes of generative AI.

Books

1770 • Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. (1966). *The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge*. Anchor Books.

— Foundational social constructivism; reinforces Wittgensteinian insights into meaning as socially co-constructed.

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• Barad, K. (2007). *Meeting the universe halfway: Quantum physics and the entanglement of matter and meaning*. Duke University Press.

— Agential realism; a relational ontology challenging subject–object splits, useful for thinking AI, agency, and sociomaterial entanglement.

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• Clark, A. (2015). *Surfing uncertainty: Prediction, action, and the embodied mind*. Oxford University Press.

— Predictive processing and embodiment; supports claims about environmental coupling vs. disembodied statistical inference.

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— Core information theory; counterpoint to use-based theories of meaning.

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— Futurist perspective on AI development and governance; raises alignment/embodiment/consciousness questions.

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— Sociological critique of digital companions; highlights over-trust and emotional misattribution risks.

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- Vallor, S. (2016). *Technology and the virtues: A philosophical guide to a future worth wanting*. Oxford University Press.

— Applies virtue ethics to technology; strong normative complement to responsible-AI concerns.

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— Classic on the politics embedded in artifacts; clarifies sociotechnical stakes of LLM deployment.

1825

Book chapter

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- Haraway, D. J. (1991). A cyborg manifesto: Science, technology, and socialist-feminism in the late twentieth century. In *Simians, cyborgs, and women: The reinvention of nature* (pp. 149–181). Routledge.

— Foundational posthumanist critique; challenges human/machine binaries and informs debates on AI agency and hybridity.

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Journal & conference papers

Reiter, R. (1980). A logic for default reasoning. *Artificial Intelligence*, 13(1–2), 81–132. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0004-3702\(80\)90014-4](https://doi.org/10.1016/0004-3702(80)90014-4)

1840 • Luger, E., & Sellen, A. (2016). “Like having a really bad PA”: The gulf between user expectation and experience of conversational agents. In Proceedings of the 2016 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems (pp. 5286–5297). <https://doi.org/10.1145/2858036.2858288>

— Empirical study showing users overestimate agent competence; supports concerns about unearned intentional stance.
1845

1850 • Ribeiro, M. T., Singh, S., & Guestrin, C. (2016). “Why should I trust you?”: Explaining the predictions of any classifier. In Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGKDD International Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining (pp. 1135–1144). <https://doi.org/10.1145/2939672.2939778>

— Seminal XAI paper introducing LIME; foundational for interpretability work relevant to LLMs.

1855

Preprints & technical reports

• Bommasani, R., Hudson, D. A., et al. (2021). On the opportunities and risks of foundation models. arXiv:2108.07258. <https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.07258>

1860 — Introduces “foundation models” as a unifying paradigm and maps technical/societal risks.

• Graves, A., Wayne, G., & Danihelka, I. (2014). Neural Turing Machines. arXiv:1410.5401. <https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.1410.5401>

1865 — Memory-augmented neural architectures; relevant to critiques of LLM statelessness/long-term coherence.

1870 • Spiegel, B. A., Gelfond, L., & Konidaris, G. (2025). Visual Theory of Mind Enables the Invention of Writing Systems. arXiv:2502.01568. <https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.01568>

— Multi-agent RL study linking visual ToM to the emergence of pictographic writing; intersects with Dennettian themes of simulation and stance attribution.

1875 Glossary of Key Terms

This glossary summarizes key conceptual terms used throughout the paper, spanning philosophy, AI design, interface framing, and empirical evaluation.

1880 Philosophical and Interpretive Concepts

- **Language game** — Wittgenstein’s notion that meaning arises from socially embedded, practice-bound uses of words within shared “forms of life.”
- **Scorekeeping** — Lewis’s idea that conversation updates a contextual “score” (presuppositions, roles, norms) via accommodation, making discourse history-sensitive.
- 1885 • **Intentional stance** — Dennett’s interpretive strategy: predict a system by treating it *as if* it had beliefs, desires, or goals—without committing to inner states.
- **Intentional fiction** — Using the intentional stance as a predictive heuristic; cautions against mistaking explanatory utility for claims about real mentality.
- 1890 • **Stance inflation** — The escalating attribution of agency or emotion to LLMs, often triggered by fluency, persona design, or persuasive explanations.
- **Nagel test** — A boundary prompt inspired by “What is it like to be a bat?” for probing whether first-person, subjective experience is even *plausible* for a system.
- **Simulation ceiling** — The conceptual limit beyond which behavioral mimicry cannot become genuine experience or sentience; distinguishes performance from being.
- 1895 • **Simulation vs. instantiation** — Contrast between imitating a capacity (simulation) and actually possessing it (instantiation).
- **Epistemic illusion** — A false sense that a system “understands” due to fluent surface form, leading users to over-ascribe knowledge or competence.
- 1900 • **Epistemic framing** — Interface and policy cues that signal the statistical, non-agentic nature of LLM outputs to reduce misinterpretation and over-trust.
- **Moral patiency** — The status of being eligible for moral consideration; used here to ask whether non-sentient systems warrant obligations typically reserved for conscious beings.
- 1905 • **Anthropomorphic creep** — The gradual drift toward perceiving non-sentient systems as agentic or emotional because of interface cues and conversational design.
- **Phenomenology** — The philosophical study of first-person experience; invoked to separate lived consciousness from behavioral simulation.
- 1910 • **Embodiment** — The view that cognition and meaning are grounded in bodily capacities, perception, action, and situated practices with feedback, correction, and consequences.

1915 **Technical and Architectural Terms**

- **Transformer architecture** — Sequence models built on self-attention and positional encodings, enabling parallel processing; foundation of modern LLMs.
- **Statelessness (inference-time)** — By default, each prompt–response is processed without persistent memory across turns unless tools (e.g., retrieval/memory) are added.
- **Token** — The tokenizer’s unit (often a subword/char) used to measure context windows and throughput.
- **Few-shot learning (in-context learning)** — Supplying a handful of exemplars at inference time so the model imitates the pattern without parameter updates.
- **Fine-tuning** — Post-pretraining optimization on curated data to specialize behavior or improve domain performance.
- **RLHF (reinforcement learning from human feedback)** — Aligns outputs with human preferences via a reward model trained on comparisons and an RL step (e.g., PPO).
- **IN2 training (Information-Intensive)** — A data-centric method that teaches models to attend to mid-sequence evidence by training on long contexts where answers rely on short, randomly positioned segments and multi-segment reasoning.
- **Lost in the Middle** — A long-context failure mode where evidence placed near the sequence center is under-utilized, degrading retrieval or reasoning.

Interpretability and Cognitive Framing Constructs

- **Score-sensitive retrieval** — Retrieval that ranks memories/ documents by relevance to the *current discourse state* (the evolving “score”), not just keyword similarity.
- **Heuristic** — A simplifying rule or approximation used by humans and models to reduce reasoning complexity.
- **Emergent behavior** — Capabilities not explicitly programmed that appear with scale/training; origins are debated (e.g., smooth scaling vs. phase-change effects).
- **SOAR** — A symbolic cognitive architecture (production rules, goal stacks, chunking) for general problem solving used in AI and cognitive psychology.
- **ACT-R (Adaptive Control of Thought—Rational)** — A modular cognitive architecture modeling human cognition with interacting declarative and procedural memory systems.

1950

Policy and Governance Terms

- **Human-in-the-loop (HITL)** — Governance / design pattern that preserves qualified human review or intervention at defined decision points, especially in high-stakes use.
- 1955 • **Provenance metadata** — Records of where outputs / claims came from (e.g., model / version, retrieval sources, timestamps, transformation steps) to support traceability and audits.
- 1960 • **Retention window** — The defined period for storing logs, prompts, outputs, and system events; balances auditability with privacy, security, and data-minimization duties.